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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the principles of war as derived 
from the teachings of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini and analyze them in terms 
of their continued applicability.  This thesis looks at the complex nature of conflict 
in the 21st century, as well as the rise of unconventional warfare in recent years, 
and how significant changes in the overall realm of combat may be diminishing 
the relative importance of the nine principles of war utilized by the United States 
military for almost two centuries.  The main objective of this study is to determine 
whether the traditionally accepted principles of war have become less applicable, 
and if so, to recommend new principles that could potentially be more 
appropriate for U.S. forces when developing new doctrine, strategy, tactics, and 
organizational structures. 
This study utilizes an heuristic approach in which the nine principles of war 
currently utilized by the United States military are projected through the lens of 
unconventional warfare in such a way as to consider whether these principles are 
no longer suitable for use when facing complex, innovative adversaries, such as 
globally networked, non-state sponsored, terrorist organizations and/or rogue 
states.  Upon demonstrating the diminished applicability of some of the nine 
principles of war still in use, this study then identifies and defines several new 
principles that should be considered as more relevant to the changing conditions 
and circumstances of conflict. 
Finally, a discussion of principles of war as formulated by Sun Tzu serves 
as a basis on which to compare and contrast Jomini’s teachings with those of 
another great military thinker whose notions regarding the art of warfare may 
provide a more suitable paradigm upon which to construct a new version of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate to the stormy 
present.  The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise 
with the new occasion.  As our case is new, so must we think anew, 
and act anew. 
President Abraham Lincoln, in an 1862 address to Congress 
 
A. SCOPE AND PURPOSE  
This study examines the modern principles of war and how they might 
need to change as a result of rapidly increasing complexity in the realm of 
warfare.  I have chosen to pursue this endeavor because I have a keen interest 
in the success of United States armed forces on the battlefields of tomorrow.  
The circumstances and challenges of conflict in the 21st century have evolved 
such that current doctrine, strategy, tactics, and organizational structures may 
have to be modified if we are to effectively combat, counter, and defeat our 
current and future adversaries. 
Military thought in the United States has been largely dominated by 
Jominian concepts for two centuries.  The idea that there exist some fundamental 
principles of war, as developed by Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini in the early 
nineteenth century, first appeared at the United States Military Academy shortly 
after its founding in 1802.  Prior to the U.S. Civil War, General Henry Wager 
Halleck translated some of Jomini’s works for inclusion in the West Point cadet 
curriculum.  Young officers such as Robert E. Lee and Ulysses S. Grant, delving 
into the knowledge obtained during their time at the academy, relied heavily upon 
Jominian principles, as did other well-known Civil War generals, during the 
course of the conflict.  It is intriguing to note that historic victories, as well as 
defeats including Lee’s overall loss of the Civil War, were the end result.  
Ironically, Lincoln could be viewed as the ultimate anti-Jominian with regard to 
his cordon offensive around the South which distributed rather than massed 
forces.  Following this significant era in United States military history, emphasis 
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on Jominian concepts persisted and his theory with regard to principles of war 
was officially adopted in a formalized manner by the United States military in 
1921.  It was at this point in history when the Army published a list of nine 
principles in its Training Regulation No. 10-5, albeit without explaining in any 
detail the underlying meaning and/or proper application of each.  Instead, the 
regulation included a mere paragraph that briefly outlined their purpose while 
simultaneously labeling them as “immutable” principles.  This list, introduced over 
80 years ago, was comprised of the same nine principles upon which U.S. armed 
forces of the 21st century are basing their organizational structures, doctrine, 
strategy, and tactics.  The modern principles of war are objective, offensive, 
mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and 
simplicity.  With the exception of maneuver and unity of command which, at the 
time of initial publication were instead termed movement and cooperation, the 
nine principles of war recognized and used by the United States military have 
remained unchanged for almost a century. (Glenn, 1998, p.2)  
Conventional warfare, characterized by large standing armies utilizing 
infantry, artillery, and cavalry, massed in carefully orchestrated formations, and 
brought to bear via intricate schemes of maneuver against similarly arrayed 
adversaries, was the predominant mode of combat in the era that inspired Jomini 
to develop his principles of war.  Since the birth of these principles at his hand 
almost 200 years ago, many wars have been waged, battles fought, and both 
victories and defeats experienced through reliance upon Jomini’s teachings as a 
foundation for doctrine, strategy, and tactics.   
Even after World War II, the Cold War provided likely scenarios which 
served to further encourage the use of his principles of war concept in order to 
formulate intricate strategies by which to achieve victory in the seemingly 
“inevitable” confrontation between the massed armored forces of NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact.  However, warfare is changing.  Perhaps Vietnam and other 
“decolonizing” people’s wars a generation ago, Operations DESERT 
SHIELD/DESERT STORM (these despite being primarily conventional in nature), 
and now the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), have provided the first glimpse of 
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a shift in the nature of warfare significant enough to lead one to consider 
revisiting Jomini’s principles of war.  Instead of the aforementioned large, 
standing armies that characterize conventional warfare, we now face adversaries 
whose composition, strategies, and tactics tend more toward the realm of 
unconventional warfare.  An elusive, highly-networked array of adversaries with 
global reach and a tendency toward utilizing terrorism, to include the employment 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defies the normal conventions of 
warfare upon which Jomini based his principles.  But this is the reality we now 
face and are likely to face to an ever heightening degree well into the future.   
Even before 11 September 2001, President George W. Bush 
challenged us to ‘redefine war in our own terms’ in response to the 
conflicts of a new century.  To meet the President’s challenge, we 
must revisit the principles of war and determine their applicability in 
the 21st century. (Morgan, 2003, p.34) 
Given the numerous roles United States armed forces will potentially play 
in ongoing and future conflicts against this relatively new and highly formidable 
breed of adversaries, it behooves us to perform a critical analysis of the 
principles upon which our military establishment bases its doctrine, strategy, and 
tactics in order to determine whether we are preparing our forces for victory or 
dooming them to ultimate failure.  Questioning the applicability of Jomini’s 
principles of war after the United States military has relied on them for almost two 
centuries is by no means a radical attempt to defy convention.  On the contrary, I 
judge it to be a pragmatic approach to scrutinize and amend said principles as 
necessary to ensure that our armed forces appropriately tailor their designs and 
methods of waging war in the future.  In his 1992 work, Masters of War: Sun Tzu, 
Clausewitz, and Jomini, Michael I. Handel alludes to the idea that the rules and 
principles of war are not cast in stone. 
Boldness, daring, and risk-taking defy rational analysis and 
transcend any rules, which is what makes them so unpredictable 
and difficult to counter…It simply means that in the unstructured, 
competitive, and probabilistic environment of war, some rules make 
sense  some  of  the  time, but all rules cannot be followed all of the  
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time.  The secret of success for the creative military genius lies in 
knowing when to break the rules of war and when to heed them. 
(Handel, 1992, p.9) 
I submit that Handel’s notion should be taken a step further in that the key to 
success is not just a product of breaking and following the rules of war as the 
situation dictates, but rather a willingness to accept that the “rules of the game” 
may have changed, in addition to keeping one’s mind open to the notion of 
actively reevaluating and modifying the very rules and principles that determine 
how one’s forces should be employed. 
 
B. OBJECTIVES & METHODOLOGY 
The main objective of this thesis is to answer the question of whether the 
nine Jominian principles of war are still applicable on the modern battlefield, 
given the fact that the spectrum of conflict has become largely dominated by 
unconventional warfare (UW).  For this undertaking, I have established a 
framework applying an heuristic approach wherein each of the nine principles is 
viewed and analyzed through the lens of unconventional warfare.  Upon 
completion of this analysis, I delve further into each of these nine principles to 
arrive at a determination regarding their applicability (or the lack thereof) to our 
military’s efforts to combat and defeat current and future adversaries likely to be 
encountered within the contemporary battlespace. 
If sufficient evidence is found to conclude that the nine Jominian principles 
of war have, in fact, become less applicable to both current and future combat 
operations and endeavors, I am prepared to provide detailed recommendations 
regarding the alteration and/or replacement of said principles.  My 
recommendations and suggestions for further research with respect to changes 
in force structures, doctrine, strategy, and tactics will be designed in such a way 
so as to address the issues that stem from any proposed changes to the 
principles of war.   
It is my sincere hope that this project will serve as a catalyst for increased 
emphasis and significant efforts to posture, prepare, and train the United States 
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military to the degree that its effectiveness and capabilities on the modern 
battlefield will be significantly enhanced.  Only through proactive innovation and a 
willingness to distance ourselves from the existing Jominian principles of war 
paradigm, when appropriate, can we expect to legitimately maintain our status as 
the world’s greatest fighting force. 
 
C. AUDIENCE 
This thesis is written primarily for policy makers, military leaders of all 
levels, and those who formulate and write military doctrine—such as the 
operations doctrinal terms and concepts found in Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0.  
Also included are the numerous variations of the principles of war utilized by 
United States Armed forces from 1836 to 1978 in order to demonstrate how the 
same general paradigm has been adhered to time and again by our nation’s 
military.  Additionally, this compilation of lists should serve to sharpen the 
contrast between the traditionally accepted principles of war currently in use and 
the list of new principles derived from this study.  The end result should be an 
increased awareness and understanding of the need to retool the modern 
principles of war so that future doctrine, strategy, tactics, and organizational 
structures are formulated to properly address and effectively mitigate the 
complexities of the modern battlefield.   
 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This paper is divided into five chapters including the introduction.  
Following the introduction in Chapter I, Chapter II addresses the historical 
background of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, the history of his principles of war 
concept, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of Jominian concepts by 
United States military thinkers, and a brief discussion of the declining trend in 
conventional warfare and strategies with regard to the 21st century battlefield.  
Chapter III defines unconventional warfare (UW) in order that the term be 
properly understood and its context established for the purpose of this study.  
This chapter goes on to discuss the growing domination of the modern battlefield 
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by numerous aspects of unconventional warfare.  Finally, it addresses the 
growing trend towards UW in combination with Jominian concepts by projecting 
the modern principles of war through the UW lens.  Chapter IV compares and 
contrasts the principles of war, in terms of continued and/or diminished 
importance with those that emerge following scrutiny through the UW frame of 
reference.  It then discusses the principles that have been determined to be no 
longer applicable and offers insight with regard to new principles that are better 
suited for the complex nature of 21st century warfare.  Finally, it compares 
Jomini’s principles with those of Sun Tzu in an effort to demonstrate that modern 
warfare and its associated principles may be better served by reliance upon the 
concepts of a different school of military thought.  The future of the principles of 
war, along with conclusions and recommendations for further research, is 





It is universally agreed upon, that no art or science is more difficult 
than that of war; yet by an unaccountable contradiction of the 
human mind, those who embrace this profession take little or no 
pains to study it.  They seem to think, that the knowledge of a few 
insignificant and useless trifles constitute a great officer.  This 
opinion is so general, that little or nothing is taught at present in any 
Army whatsoever.  The continual changes and variety of motions, 
evolutions, etc., which the soldiers are taught, prove evidently, they 
are founded on mere caprice.  This art, like all others, is founded on 
certain fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable; the 
application of them can only be varied: but they are themselves 
constant. 
General Henry Lloyd, Field Commander in the Austrian Army 
during the Seven Years’ War, 1766 
 
A. HISTORY OF JOMINI AND HIS PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
In order for one to critically analyze Jomini’s principles of war and develop 
new theories regarding their continued applicability to 21st century warfare, one 
must first obtain a more thorough understanding of their origin.  To gain a better 
appreciation for these nine principles, often referred to as “immutable,” as well as 
for the military genius whose experiences as a staff officer under Napoleon and 
extraordinary understanding of the military art allowed him to masterfully 
orchestrate their formulation, I submit that we should first examine Jomini’s 
background.  By looking back and delving into his life, military career, and the 
circumstances that shaped his tactical and strategic thinking, one can begin to 
more clearly comprehend how Jomini developed his principles of war and 
created a concept that has remained relatively unaltered for almost two 
centuries. 
Numerous authors and military historians make mention of Baron Antoine 
Henri de Jomini and his development of a set of universal principles of war 
stemming from the study and observation of Napoleonic warfare and strategy.  
Four of these authors/historians in particular—Azar Gat (1992), Gerard Chaliand 
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(1994), John Shy (1986), and J. D. Hittle (1958)—provide significant levels of 
detail in their individual works with regard to Jomini’s personal history and 
background in addition to their discussions of his contributions to the study of the 
military art.  As a result, I am relying on the contributions of these authorities to 
assist me in providing a consolidated history of Jomini and his principles of war.  
By doing so, I hope to broaden the reader’s awareness of Jomini’s military genius 
and provide valuable insight with regard to the origins of his nine “immutable” 
principles.  I firmly believe this to be a crucial first step toward effectively 
conducting a critical analysis of Jomini’s principles of war in order to determine 
whether they are still applicable to modern warfare. 
Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini was born in Switzerland in 1779.  Of Italian 
ancestry, he was raised in a middle-class family and was afforded both an 
education and upbringing normally associated with that particular level of the 
social class hierarchy.  Upon completion of his schooling, he entered the labor 
force as a bank employee in Paris.  Disenchanted by the boring monotony that 
characterized this occupation, Jomini quickly determined that the banking 
industry was not the niche he was destined to occupy in life.  In sharp contrast to 
the world of finance, he saw much greater promise in the glory and excitement of 
serving in the French Army under Napoleon Bonaparte.  Thus, at the tender age 
of seventeen, Jomini joined the French Army and embarked upon his lifelong 
career of military service.  From the outset, he aspired to achieve greatness in 
his chosen profession.  Rather than pursue a hasty enlistment and settle for 
service as a private, Jomini sought out and managed to obtain a position as a 
staff officer where he was tasked to handle basic logistics issues and concerns.  
This initial duty assignment was merely a stepping stone to Jomini whose 
tremendous ambition, combined with innate curiosity and natural ability, enabled 
him to envision the attainment of higher positions of responsibility, influence, and 
importance (Hittle, 1958, pp.2-3). 
One area of expertise that served to accelerate Jomini’s career in the 
French Army was his demonstrated aptitude for complex military thinking.  In 
chapter six of Peter Paret’s Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the 
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Nuclear Age, John Shy explains that Jomini himself credits the exploits of the 
French Army of Italy under Napoleon from 1796 – 1797 with catalyzing his keen 
interest in military theory (p.147).  It was these stunning military achievements, 
combined with Jomini’s intense study of war in general and the financial 
assistance of General Ney, that led to the publication of his first book in 1803.  
Perhaps it was this point in Jomini’s life, at the age of twenty-four, that we can 
begin to see his principles of war in the earliest stages of their development.   
As Shy writes, 
Not only was he obsessed by visions of military glory, with himself 
imitating the incredible rise of Bonaparte who was only ten years 
his senior, but in a telling phrase Jomini remembered being 
possessed, even then, by “le sentiment des principes”—the 
Platonic faith that reality lies beneath the superficial chaos of the 
historical moment in enduring and invariable principles, like those of 
gravitation and probability.  To grasp those principles, as well as to 
satisfy the more primitive emotional needs of ambition and youthful 
impatience, was what impelled him to the study of war.  Voracious 
reading of military history and theorizing from it would reveal the 
secret of French victory. (Paret, 1986, p.148) 
Jomini credits General Henry Lloyd as being the greatest contributor to his 
demonstrated proficiency in the areas of military theory and strategic thought.  
Lloyd, a Welshman, commanded one of the key field units in the Austrian Army 
during the Seven Years’ War.  Based on his experiences in that conflict, he wrote 
a history of the German campaigns that occurred therein.  In his writings, he 
openly criticized Frederick II’s abilities as a warfare strategist and accordingly, 
raised the eyebrows of many within the military community.  Likewise, Lloyd’s 
Military Memoirs, originally published in 1781 as Continuation of the History of 
the Late War in Germany, generated considerable levels of interest and 
excitement.  Essentially, this work was nothing more than a lengthy essay on “the 
General Principles of War.”  Nevertheless, the contents of those memoirs had a 
vital impact on Jomini’s thinking. 
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Lloyd provided both a model and a challenge in the young man’s 
efforts to reduce the fantastic world of war at the end of the 
eighteenth century to some kind of intellectual order. (Paret, 1986, 
p.148) 
Unfortunately, Lloyd’s “invariable principles” had little to offer in terms of useful 
content.  Instead, his emphasis was on providing a logical analysis of the 
strategy and tactics that had proven successful in European warfare prior to the 
French Revolution.  Although his approach to war as a science was appropriate 
to the Enlightenment, it failed to take into account the changing conditions and 
ground-breaking innovations that characterized Napoleonic warfare and the age 
of revolution.  Napoleon read Lloyd’s works with contempt, but Jomini 
appreciated Lloyd’s scientific approach because it embraced the manner in which 
he himself viewed the study of warfare and military theory.  Understanding that 
Lloyd’s conclusions did not explain the numerous successes achieved by 
Napoleon, Jomini set out upon his own study of strategy and tactics in the realm 
of Napleonic warfare, using Lloyd as the model which he would then refine and 
eventually transform into the foundation for his own legacy of military thought  
(Paret, 1986, p.149). 
I fell back then, upon works of military history in order to seek, in 
the combinations of the great captains, a solution which those 
systems of  the writers did not give me.  Already had the narratives 
of Frederick the Great commenced to initiate me in the secret which 
had caused him to gain the miraculous victory of Leuthen (Lissa).  I 
perceived that this secret consisted in the very simple maneuver of 
carrying the bulk of his forces upon a single wing of the hostile 
army; and Lloyd soon came to fortify me in this conviction.  I found 
again, afterwards, the same cause in the first successes of 
Napoleon in Italy, which gave me the idea that by applying, through 
strategy, to the whole chess-table of a war this same principle 
which Frederick had applied to battles, we should have the key to 
all the  science of war (Jomini, 1838, as cited in Paret). 
Despite Lloyd’s influence and significant contributions to Jomini’s ultimate 
preeminence as a master of the military art, he himself failed to achieve any 
significant renown and is nearly forgotten in military history. 
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 Jomini’s first significant work, Traite des Grandes Operations, albeit not 
his greatest accomplishment, played a pivotal role in his ascension to the 
position of military consultant for the many leaders of the world’s great powers 
(Hittle, 1958, p.7).  A heavy treatise which dealt with the campaigns of Frederick 
the Great, this work quickly captured the attention and imagination of Napoleon 
after Jomini successfully seized the opportunity to present it to him.  In short 
order, Napoleon recognized Jomini to be a man who truly understood and 
appreciated the Napoleonic military method.  In admiration of what he perceived 
to be a brilliant military mind, Napoleon awarded Jomini with a regular colonel’s 
commission and directed that he be assigned to perform duties as a member of 
his staff at Mainz (Hittle, 1958, pp.3-4).  In 1813, Jomini was promoted to the 
rank of general de brigade and assigned as Chief of Staff for Marshal Ney, a 
position in which he excelled and eventually earned the Marshal’s 
recommendation for promotion to general de division.  He was, however, denied 
promotion as a result of the treachery of Berthier, Napoleon’s Chief of Staff and 
Jomini’s chief rival.  Disappointed, but determined, Jomini resigned from the 
French Army and accepted a commission as full general in the Russian Army 
under Alexander.  In Moscow, he worked tirelessly to enhance Russian military 
thought.  In the process of doing so, he played a key role in founding the 
Nicholas Military Academy in Moscow in 1832.  His passion for military study 
continued to flourish and he repeatedly produced volumes of thoroughly detailed 
military history and theory.   
 Before his death in Paris in 1869 at the age of 90, Jomini wrote twenty-
seven volumes on the subject of military history and theory, covering the 
operations of Frederick the Great, the Wars of the French Revolution, and the 
Napoleonic campaigns.  By far, his greatest work was the Precis de L’Art de la 
Guerre (Summary of the Art of War) which was published in 1838.  This 
theoretical treatise served as a highly-refined summation of the doctrine, 
strategy, and military theory in which he was so deeply immersed for more than 
twenty-five years.    
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All those ideas embodied in earlier books appear to be sifted 
carefully and evaluated in terms of his more mature and considered 
judgment before they found their way into the famous Summary.  
This book was recognized as an epic contribution to military 
thought.  It was translated into practically all the important 
languages. (Hittle, 1958, p.10) 
Jomini’s development of practical military theory, as well as his subsequent 
teachings on the subject, were derived from his numerous, first-hand 
experiences on the battlefield.  A veritable professor of the Napoleonic method of 
warfare, he skillfully wielded his pen to produce works that effectively schooled 
many of the world’s military thinkers in the art of modern war (Hittle, 1958, p.36). 
In the latter years of his life he had the pleasant satisfaction of 
knowing that he was looked upon as one of the foremost military 
minds in the world.  His books were essentials of military education. 
(Hittle, 1958, p.7) 
Although his teachings and contributions in the realm of military thought were 
embraced and heeded by many, Jomini was not without a fair share of critics.  In 
addition to Napoleon’s chief of staff, Alexander Berthier, who sharply criticized 
Jomini’s Traite as being wholly inconclusive (Alger, 1982, p.21), other military 
thinkers, such as Carl von Clausewitz, were outspoken in their arguments 
against Jomini’s works.  Clausewitz viewed Jomini’s theory as being “one-sided” 
and strove to provide a more complete, well-rounded approach to the theory of 
warfare through the creation of numerous works.  His writings about the 1812 
campaign in Russia, though a relative masterpiece, received little recognition and 
became destined for obscurity.  In contrast, On War achieved widespread 
acclaim and was probably his greatest work.  In this famous publication, it is 
significant to note that Clausewitz specifically warned against a reliance on set 
principles.  Bernard Brodie, in War and Politics (1973), writes, 
Although Clausewitz himself frequently spoke loosely of certain 
“principles” to be observed and followed,…he specifically rejected 
the notion that there could be any well-defined body of particular 
rules or principles that universally dictated one form of behavior 
rather than another. (p.446)  
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Clausewitz sought to identify the aspects of warfare that were constant rather 
than support the notion of fleeting principles specific to a particular campaign or 
era.  He concluded that only by doing so could effective military theory be 
developed and successfully applied throughout the ages.  Peter Paret, in his 
essay The Genesis of On War, comments, 
If the present did not provide the ideal against which war in the past 
could be measured, Clausewitz was equally insistent that 
Napoleonic war could not establish standards for the future.  What 
did this mean for theory?  To Clausewitz the answer was obvious:  
The theory of any activity, even if it aimed at effective performance 
rather than comprehensive understanding, must discover the 
essential, timeless elements of this activity, and distinguish them 
from its temporary features.  Violence and political impact were two 
of the permanent characteristics of war.  Another was the free play 
of human intelligence, will, and emotions.  These were the forces 
that dominated the chaos of warfare, not such schematic devices 
as Bulow’s base of operations or Jomini’s operating on interior 
lines. (Howard & Paret, 1976, p.11) 
Essentially, Clausewitz’s On War was a written critique of Jominian thought, but 
his approach therein was viewed as overly philosophical and impractical by war’s 
practitioners.  Despite his warnings, military theorists strongly desired to pursue 
the formulation of a concise list of immutable principles.  As a result, Clausewitz’s 
teachings gave way to continued emphasis on Jominian concepts.  It is perhaps 
ironic, and would be much to Clausewitz’s chagrin, that On War ultimately 
resulted in his being viewed as a prime contributor to the modern principles of 
war (Alger, 1982, pp.28-29). 
 
B. JOMINI’S PRINCIPLES OF WAR – A REVIEW 
Far from the concise list that characterizes the principles of war utilized by 
the United States military today, Jomini’s principles emerged in a somewhat 
obscure and ambiguous fashion.  Despite being credited with the main thrust of 
contributions that were ultimately transformed into the modern principles of war, 
there exists little, if any, evidence to suggest that Jomini, or his contemporary 
Clausewitz, ever actually developed the first formal list of these principles.  
Through the course of my research, I found John Alger to be a key source of 
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information, vital to navigating the circuitous route by which Jomini’s writings 
evolved into the list of principles currently in use by the military profession.  In 
The Quest for Victory (1982), Alger points out the various terms, used 
synonymously by military thinkers and theorists, to explain what they felt were 
the basic set of truths concerning warfare. 
Because principles of war are fundamental truths pertinent to the 
practice of war, the earliest known writers who contributed to the 
understanding of such fundamentals are rightfully called military 
philosophers.  In the millenniums of recorded history that preceded 
Napoleon, military philosophers identified fundamentals that to 
them conveyed essential information concerning the practice of 
war.  They organized their thoughts in varying ways and generally 
called attention to some precepts that they considered to be of 
greater importance…terms for these important precepts varied.  
They were called principles, maxims, theories, axioms, rules, or 
judgments.  Regardless of the generic term used or the number of 
precepts identified, concepts that today are accepted as “principles 
of war” frequently appeared in early writings on war. (Alger, 1982, 
p.4) 
As a military philosopher, Jomini was no different than his predecessors when 
attempting to articulate his notions about the art of war and its underlying 
principles.  Throughout his numerous writings, he was, at best, inconsistent in the 
application of his methodology and in his utilization of various definitions when 
attempting to explain his concepts regarding the regulating principles of the 
conduct of war (p.19).  The first work by Jomini, in which one can begin to see 
the origins of the modern principles of war, is his Traite de grande tactique, ou 
relation de la guerre de sept ans, extradite de Tempelhof, commentee aux 
principales operations de la derniere guerre; avec un recueil des maxims les plus 
importantes de l’art militaire, justifiees par ces differents evenements (Treatise on 
grand tactics, or a discussion of the Seven Years War, taken from Tempelhof, 
commented upon and compared to the principal operations of the latest war; with 
a collection of the most important maxims of the military art justified by these 
different events) (pp.19-20).  A firm believer in the notion that the concepts of 
operational lines and grand tactics together comprised the foundation of the 
science of war, Jomini developed a total of eleven maxims on lines of operations, 
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five of which he included in Volume I and the rest in Volume II of his Traite.(pp. 
20-21)  Unfortunately, he wrote these initial volumes and addressed these 
maxims in much the same way as Lloyd attempted to address his “invariable 
principles” in the aforementioned Military Memoirs. 
Jomini’s first two volumes hardly differed from the earlier work of 
Lloyd as far as “principles” were concerned.  Maxims and principles 
were identified but scattered.  Some summaries were provided, and 
little attention was paid to semantic distinctions among the various 
branches of war and among the terms principle, maxim, and rule.  
Furthermore, little attention was given to clarity; frequent repetition 
of similar thoughts and redundancy confused the stated concept 
(Alger, 1982, p.21). 
Jomini later consolidated his maxims on the conduct of war in a stand-alone 
conclusion to his Traite which he published in 1807.  His new chapter, titled 
“Resume of the General Principles of the Art of War,” was by no means a 
complete listing of the principles of war that Jomini held dear, nor did it clarify 
potential differences in the terms maxim and principle because he continued to 
use both interchangeably.(p.21)  However, because Jomini had finally presented 
his concept, “as a list of general truths whose application contributes to success 
in war,” they may be legitimately viewed, “as the prototype of the modern 
‘principles of war’”(Alger, 1982, p.23).  The actual list, to include Jomini’s 
discussion of what he considers his “fundamental principle,” is as follows: 
The fundamental principle, whose application is necessary to insure 
the success of strategical decisions and without which all 
strategical decisions are fatal, is to operate with the greatest mass 
of forces, in a combined effort, against the decisive point….The 
means of applying this great maxim are not very numerous; it is 
enough to read of the operations of Napoleon and Frederick to gain 
an exact idea of them.  I am going to try to point out all of them. 
1.  The first means is to take the initiative of movement.  The 
general who succeeds in gaining this advantage is the master of 
the employment of his forces at the place where he chooses to take 
them.  On the other hand, the general who waits for the enemy can 
make no strategical decision since he has subordinated his 
movements to those of his adversary and since he does not have 
time to stop the troops that are already in motion.  The general who 
takes the initiative knows what he is going to do; he conceals his 
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movements, surprises and crushes an extremity or weak point.  
The general who waits is beaten at one point before he learns of 
the attack. 
2.  The second means is to direct movement against the most 
important weak point of the enemy’s forces.  The selection of this 
point depends upon the position of the enemy.  The most important 
point will always be the point that offers the most favorable 
opportunities and the greatest results: for example, positions that 
may lead to the severing of the line of communications between the 
enemy force and his base of operations. 
3.  The result of the preceding truths is that if preference is given to 
the attack of the extremities of a line, then care must be taken not 
to attack both of the extremities at the same time…. 
4.  In order to be able to act in a combined effort on a single point, it 
is important to hold your forces in an area that is very nearly square 
so that they will be highly dispatchable.  Large fronts are as 
contrary to good principles as broken lines, large detachments and 
divisions isolated beyond supporting distance. 
5.  One of the most efficacious ways to apply the general principle 
is to make the enemy commit errors that are contrary to the 
principle…. 
6.  It is very important when one takes the initiative to be well 
informed of the positions of the enemy and of the movements that 
he is capable of undertaking.  Espionage is a useful means…. 
7.  It is not sufficient for success in war to skillfully bring masses to 
the most important points; it is necessary to know how to employ 
them there.  If a force arrives at a decisive point and is inactive, the 
principle is forgotten; the enemy can counterattack…. 
8.  If the art of war consists of bringing the superior effort of a mass 
against the weak points of the enemy, it is undeniably necessary to 
pursue actively a beaten army…. 
9.  In order to make superior shock of a mass decisive, the general 
must give care to raise the morale of his army…. 
10.  By this rapid review, it is seen that the science of war is 
composed of three general activities, which have only a few 
subdivisions and few opportunities of execution….The first is to 
hold the most favorable lines of operations….Second is the art of 
moving masses as rapidly as possible to the decisive point….Third 
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is the art of simultaneously bringing the greatest mass to the most 
important point on the field of battle. (Alger, 1982, pp.22-23) 
 This list of maxims was, perhaps, the closest Jomini ever came to the 
modern principles of war.  By the time he published his last writings on the study 
of military theory, more than thirty years of study and experience in the art of 
waging war amounted to little more than his summary statement that,  
There exists a small number of fundamental principles of war, 
which could not be deviated from without danger, and the 
application of which, on the contrary, has been in almost all time 
crowned with success. (Hittle, 1958, p.43) 
Jomini never clearly defined the general principles of war, nor did he provide 
concise details concerning the “fundamental principles” mentioned above.  
However, he remained emphatic throughout his writings that they did, in fact, 
exist, and he maintained a tight grip on his belief in the concept of one great 
fundamental principle.(Alger, 1982, p.27) 
It is proposed to show that there is one great principle underlying all 
the operations of war,--a principle which must be followed in all 
good combinations.  It is embraced in the following maxims:-- 
1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, 
successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also 
upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible 
without compromising one’s own. 
2.  To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the 
bulk of one’s forces. 
3.  On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the 
decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of 
the first importance to overthrow. 
4.  To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon 
the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times 
and with energy. (Jomini, 1992, p.70) 
Jomini’s critics and contemporaries, such as Clausewitz and Archduke 
Charles of Austria, as well as other military theorists whose pursuits ran parallel 
to Jomini’s in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all contributed in 
varying degrees to the modern principles of war in use today.  However, it was 
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Jomini, more than any other, who was most influential in shaping the military 
institutions of those periods because the prevalent methods of soldier training 
were based, in large part, upon his teachings (Alger, 1982, p.31).  Further 
development of Jomini’s ideas on the principles of war and their ultimate 
evolution into the present-day, concise list can be traced back to the courses of 
study in military history and theory offered by the leading military schools of the 
nineteenth century.  The Prussian War College, Britain’s Royal Military College, 
West Point, and the French Artillery and Engineer School were just a few of the 
hallowed institutions whose teachings served to promote Jomini’s principles of 
war concept.  Independent writers also expounded upon his ideas in numerous 
works during this timeframe.  Before long, the contributions of both the learning 
institutions and the various literary works resulted in a widespread belief that the 
principles of war concept was, indeed valid (Alger, 1982, p.32).  Since this study 
is primarily concerned with the modern principles of war as they pertain to the 
United States military, let us focus on the manner in which Jomini’s concepts first 
appeared in American military thinking. 
The Jominian concept of principles of war was initially introduced to the 
United States in 1817 by John Michael O’Connor.  As part of his translation of de 
Vernon’s Traite elementaire d’art militaire et de fortification (Elementary treatise 
on the military art and fortifications), O’Connor included a modified translation of 
Jomini’s chapter on general principles.  In his introductory comments for the 
chapter on Jomini, he hailed Jomini’s principles and maxims as being “the grand 
principles of the science” (Alger, 1982, p.42).  O’Connor’s translation was used at 
the United States Military Academy until 1820, when Dennis Hart Mahan, the 
father of U.S. naval pioneer Alfred Thayer Mahan, arrived and replaced it with 
numerous texts of this own.  Both Mahan and Sylvanus Thayer, despite having 
had extensive exposure to the use of military history and strategy studies at 
some of the leading military learning institutions of Europe, gave little emphasis 
to the pursuit of such learning endeavors at West Point.  Courses designed to 
specifically address these topics were deemed to be unnecessary and were 
subsequently left out of the West Point curriculum.  Despite a strong reluctance 
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to embrace Jomini’s concept of principles of war, Mahan “maintained an almost 
dogmatic belief in the existence of principles for the conduct of war” (Alger, 1982, 
p.43).  Accordingly, the majority of his writings were largely dominated by a 
principles-based approach to understanding numerous circumstances in a variety 
of subject areas.   
The tendency to enumerate was not confined to the study of 
scientific or engineering subjects, for an examination of the titles 
alone of the texts used at the military academy in the period 
between its founding in 1802 and 1860 reveals that nearly one—
quarter of the titles of texts used in humanities courses claimed to 
present the “elements of” or the “principles of” some particular 
subject.  In the sciences, nearly 30 percent of the titles of texts 
claimed to present “principles” or “elements.” (Alger, 1982, p.43) 
 As the United States Military Academy and other formal military schools 
began to slowly expand their horizons and adopt Jomini’s concepts, individual 
writers external to these institutions began to embrace and tout Jomini as well.  
In 1846, General Henry Wager Halleck translated Jomini’s Vie politique et 
militaire de Napoleon (Political and military life of Napoleon) and published a 
consolidated series of lectures that dealt specifically with military art and science.  
Examination of Halleck’s work provides significant indications of the level to 
which he was enamored with Jomini’s teachings. 
Halleck presented terse principles, rules, and maxims and used the 
terms interchangeably.  For example, he stated, “The first and most 
important rule in offensive war is, to keep your forces as much 
concentrated as possible.  This will not only prevent misfortune, but 
secure victory.”  On the next page, he added, “If, as we have seen, 
it be the first great rule for an army acting on the offensive principle, 
to keep its forces concentrated, it is no doubt, the second, to keep 
them fully employed.”  He then referred to these “great rules” as the 
“leading maxims for conducting offensive war.”  In  referring to 
Jomini’s Precis in highly complementary terms, Halleck claimed 
that its chapter on strategy embodied the principles of that branch, 
and in referring to Napoleon’s memoirs, he claimed that they 
contain “all the general principles of military art and science.” 
(Alger, 1982, pp.45-46) 
Halleck’s writings went on to become a useful guide and were widely read by 
American military personnel.   
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 In 1860, Jefferson Davis led a committee charged with reviewing the 
overall organization, discipline system, and curriculum in use by West Point.  
During the course of its review, the committee voiced considerable concern over 
the lack of emphasis on the study of strategy and military history.  Still, only 
subtle changes occurred with regard to the attention that these topics received in 
the classroom.  It wasn’t until the beginning of the U.S. Civil War that Mahan 
began including more on strategy in his approach to teaching.  Increased interest 
in the topic displayed by the cadets, combined with various events within the war 
itself, led Mahan to expand one of his more famous works, Advanced-Guard, 
Outpost, and Detachment Service of Troops, through the addition of “a concise 
statement of the Principles of Strategy and Grand Tactics”.  In doing so, he 
appears to have concurred somewhat with Jomini’s fundamental principle of 
success through concentration of one’s forces.   
The Civil War itself contained numerous campaigns and engagements 
that pitted Jominian principles against themselves.  Military leaders from both 
sides embraced concepts and principles learned while studying as 
contemporaries at the military academy prior to the rise and secession of the 
Confederacy.  This devotion to Jomini by both Union and Confederate leaders 
produced decisive victories as well as crushing defeats for both sides throughout 
the duration of the conflict to include General Robert E. Lee’s overall defeat and 
surrender by war’s end.  One can only surmise that the outcomes of numerous 
engagements between armies using the same Jominian principles were varied 
as a result of significant differences in skill with regard to the proper and effective 
application of said principles.  That being said, several key victories in the Civil 
War were the result of rather anti-Jominian approaches to warfare, as evidenced 
by Lee’s division of his small force into even smaller components at 
Chancellorsville and the emphasis by Lincoln on a cordon offensive which 
distributed, rather than massed, Union forces.  
 Following the end of the U.S. Civil War, the concept of principles of war 
appeared in various forms throughout military literature in the United States.  
Gustave J. Fiebeger, a professor of civil and military engineering at West Point 
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from 1896 to 1922, published Elements of Strategy which contained a list of 
twenty-one “military principles” derived from the teachings of Napoleon and 
Jomini.  The 1905 edition of U.S. Service Regulations contained “general 
principles” of myriad activities specific to field service, but referred to the 
principles specific to combat as “general considerations.”  In 1911, U.S. Infantry 
Drill Regulations identified a list of fourteen “imperatives” deemed essential for 
success in war.  Following revision in 1913, U.S. Field Service Regulations 
replaced the 1905 “general considerations” with an expanded section titled 
“General Principles.”  Revised and published again in 1914, U.S. Field Service 
Regulations included ten paragraphs of “combat principles.”  In contrast to the 
general principles of combat in the 1913 edition which were largely informational 
in nature, these ten paragraphs were stated much more imperatively and 
contained ideas and concepts eerily similar to those introduced by Jomini.   
The imperatives summarized in the 1914 Regulations, however, 
were not called the principles of war, they were not identified by 
titles of one or a few words, they were not immutable, or at least no 
claim was made that they were immutable, and the claim was not 
made that their application would ensure success in war.  
Nevertheless, the enumeration of ten imperatives, referred to as 
“combat principles,” demonstrated the official acceptance of the 
belief in the existence of principles and a proclivity to enumerate 
definitive principles for the conduct of war in official doctrine. (Alger, 
1982, p.105) 
Over time, increasing emphasis on the development of a terse, simple, list of the 
principles of war, thought by many to be the key to the effective understanding 
and use of said principles in combat, resulted in a steady, evolutionary process 
that ultimately produced the modern principles of war in use today.  A detailed 
history of the principles of war used by the United States military can be found in 
Appendix A—Chronology of United States Principles of War.  For the purposes of 
this study, I will use the principles of war currently found in the United States 
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, effective June 2001.  The principles of 
war contained therein are credited as the foundation of operations.  They are 
introduced as follows: 
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The nine principles of war provide general guidance for conducting 
war and military operations other than war at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  The principles are the enduring 
bedrock of Army doctrine.  The U.S. Army published its original 
principles of war after World War I.  In the following years, the Army 
adjusted the original principles, but overall they have stood the 
tests of analysis, experimentation, and practice.  The principles of 
war are not a checklist.  They do not apply in the same way to 
every situation.  Rather, they summarize the characteristics of 
successful Army operations.  Their greatest value lies in the 
education of the military professional.  Applied to the study of past 
campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements, the 
principles of war are powerful tools for analysis. (pp.4-11 – 4-12) 
FM 3-0 identifies, defines, and provides an explanation for each of the nine 
principles of war in the following manner: 
Objective – Direct every military operation toward a clearly 
defined, decisive, and attainable objective.  At the operational 
and tactical levels, objective means ensuring all actions contribute 
to the goals of the higher headquarters.  The principle of the 
objective drives all military activity.  When undertaking any mission, 
commanders should have a clear understanding of the expected 
outcome and its impact.  At the strategic level, this means having a 
clear vision of the theater end state.  Commanders need to 
appreciate political ends and understand how the military conditions 
they achieve contribute to them. 
Offensive – Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.  Offensive 
action is key to achieving decisive results.  It is the essence of 
successful operations.  Offensive actions are those taken to dictate 
the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation.  They force the 
enemy to react.  Commanders use offensive actions to impose their 
will on an enemy, adversary, or situation.  Offensive operations are 
essential to maintain the freedom of action necessary for success, 
exploit vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations and 
unexpected developments. 
Mass – Concentrate the effects of combat power at the 
decisive place and time.  Commanders mass the effects of 
combat power to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the 
situation.  They mass combat power in time and space to achieve 
both destructive and constructive results.  Massing in time applies 
the elements of combat power against multiple targets 
simultaneously.  Massing in space concentrates the effects of 
different elements of combat power against a single target.  Both 
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dominate the situation; commanders select the method that best fits 
the circumstances.  To an increasing degree, joint and Army 
operations mass the full effects of combat power in both time and 
space, rather than one or the other.  Such effects overwhelm the 
entire enemy defensive system before he can react effectively. 
Economy of Force – Allocate minimum essential combat 
power to secondary efforts.  Economy of force is the reciprocal of 
mass.  It requires accepting prudent risk in selected areas to 
achieve superiority—overwhelming effects—in the decisive 
operation.  Economy of force involves the discriminating 
employment and distribution of forces.  Commanders never leave 
any element without a purpose.  When it comes time to execute, all 
elements should have tasks to perform. 
Maneuver – Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position 
through the flexible application of combat power.  As both an 
element of combat power and a principle of war, maneuver 
concentrates and disperses combat power to place and keep the 
enemy at a disadvantage.  It achieves results that would otherwise 
be more costly.  Effective maneuver keeps enemies off balance by 
making them confront new problems and new dangers faster than 
they can deal with them.  Army forces gain and preserve freedom 
of action, reduce vulnerability, and exploit success through 
maneuver.  Maneuver is more than just fire and movement.  It 
includes the dynamic, flexible application of leadership, firepower, 
information, and protection as well.  It requires flexibility in thought, 
plans, and operations and the skillful application of mass, surprise, 
and economy of force. 
Unity of Command – For every objective, ensure unity of effort 
under one responsible commander.  Developing the full combat 
power of a force requires unity of command.  Unity of command 
means that a single commander directs and coordinates the actions 
of all forces toward a common objective.  Cooperation may produce 
coordination, but giving a single commander the required authority 
unifies action.  The joint, multinational, and interagency nature of 
unified action creates situations where the military commander 
does not directly control all elements in the AO.  In the absence of 
command authority, commanders cooperate, negotiate, and build 
consensus to achieve unity of effort. 
Security – Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected 
advantage.  Security protects and preserves combat power.  It 
does not involve excessive caution.  Calculated risk is inherent to 
conflict.  Security results from measures taken by a command to 
protect itself from surprise, interference, sabotage, annoyance, and 
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threat ISR.  Military deception greatly enhances security.  The 
threat of asymmetric action requires emphasis on security, even in 
low-threat environments. 
Surprise – Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner 
for which he is unprepared.  Surprise is the reciprocal of security.  
Surprise results from taking actions for which an enemy or 
adversary is unprepared.  It is a powerful but temporary combat 
multiplier.  It is not essential to take the adversary or enemy 
completely unaware; it is only necessary that he become aware too 
late to react effectively.  Factors contributing to surprise include 
speed, information superiority, and asymmetry. 
Simplicity – Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, 
concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.  Plans and 
orders should be simple and direct.  Simple plans and clear, 
concise orders reduce misunderstanding and confusion.  The 
factors of METT-TC determine the degree of simplicity required.  
Simple plans executed on time are better than detailed plans 
executed late.  Commanders at all levels weigh the apparent 
benefits of a complex concept of operations against the risk that 
subordinates will not be able to understand or follow it.  
Multinational operations put a premium on simplicity.  Differences in 
language, doctrine, and culture complicate multinational operations.  
Simple plans and orders minimize the confusion inherent in this 
complex environment.  The same applies to operations involving 
interagency and nongovernmental organizations. (pp.4-12 – 4-15) 
An explanation of acronyms found in the preceding definitions, as well as 
throughout this thesis, can be found in the List of Acronyms.  The current version 
of FM 3-0 also presents what it terms, The Tenets of Army Operations.  These 
tenets, identified as initiative, agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility, are 
framed such that they are designed to build on the foundation established by 
proper application of the aforementioned principles of war.  The manual deems 
them essential to the achievement of victory.  Thus, they are “probabilistic” 
principles.  “While they do not guarantee success, their absence risks failure” 
(p.4-15).  The tenets of Army operations are explained in greater detail as 
follows: 
Initiative – Initiative has both operational and individual 
components.  From an operational perspective, initiative is setting 
or dictating the terms of action throughout the battle or operation.  
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Initiative implies an offensive spirit in all operations.  To set the 
terms of battle, commanders eliminate or reduce the number of 
enemy options.  They compel the enemy to conform to friendly 
operational purposes and tempo, while retaining freedom of action.  
Army leaders anticipate events throughout the battlespace.  
Through effective command and control (C2), they enable their 
forces to act before and react faster than the enemy does.  From an 
individual perspective, initiative is the ability to be a self-starter, to 
act when there are no clear instructions or when the situation 
changes.  An individual leader with initiative is willing to decide and 
initiate independent actions when the concept of operations no 
longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the 
accomplishment of the commander’s intent presents itself.  Despite 
advances in C2 from digital technology, individual initiative remains 
important for successful operations.  In battle, leaders exercise this 
attribute when they act independently within the framework of the 
commander’s intent.  They trust their subordinates to do the same.  
Disciplined initiative requires well-trained and competent leaders 
who carry out studied and considered actions. 
Agility – Agility is the ability to move and adjust quickly and easily.  
It springs from trained and disciplined forces.  Agility requires that 
subordinates act to achieve the commander’s intent and fight 
through any obstacle to accomplish the mission.  Operational agility 
stems from the capability to deploy and employ forces across the 
range of Army operations.  Army forces and commanders shift 
among offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as 
circumstances and missions require.  This capability is not merely 
physical; it requires conceptual sophistication and intellectual 
flexibility.  Tactical agility is the ability of a friendly force to react 
faster than the enemy.  It is essential to seizing, retaining, and 
exploiting the initiative.  Agility is mental and physical.  Agile 
commanders quickly comprehend unfamiliar situations, creatively 
apply doctrine, and make timely decisions. 
Depth – Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and 
resources.  Commanders use depth to obtain space for effective 
maneuver, time to conduct operations, and resources to achieve 
and exploit success.  Depth enables momentum in the offense, 
elasticity in the defense, and staying power in all operations.  In the 
offense and defense, depth entails attacking the enemy throughout 
the AO—simultaneously when possible, sequentially when 
necessary—to deny him freedom of maneuver.  Offensive depth 
allows commanders to sustain momentum and press the fight.  
Defensive depth creates opportunities to maneuver against the 
enemy from multiple directions as attacking forces are exposed or 
discovered.  In stability operations and support operations, depth 
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extends influence in time, space, purpose, and resources to affect 
the environment and conditions.  In stability operations, ISR 
combined with IO help commanders understand factional motives, 
identify power centers, and shape the environment.  In support 
operations, depth in resources, planning, and time allows 
commanders to stop suffering and prevent or slow the spread of 
disease.  In all operations, staying power—depth of action—comes 
from adequate resources.  Depth of resources in quantity, 
positioning, and mobility is critical to executing military operations.  
Commanders balance depth in resources with agility.  A large 
combat service support (CSS) tail can hinder maneuver, but 
inadequate CSS makes the force fragile and vulnerable. 
Synchronization – Synchronization is arranging activities in time, 
space, and purpose to mass maximum relative combat power at a 
decisive place and time.  Without synchronization, there is no 
massing of effects.  Through synchronization, commanders arrange 
battlefield operating systems to mass the effects of combat power 
at the chosen place and time to overwhelm an enemy or dominate 
the situation.  Synchronization is a means, not an end.  
Commanders balance synchronization against agility and initiative; 
they never surrender the initiative or miss a decisive opportunity for 
the sake of synchronization.  Some activities—such as electronic 
warfare, suppressing enemy air defenses, and shifting maneuver 
forces—might occur before the decisive operation.  They may take 
place at locations distant from each other.  Though separated in 
time and space, commanders closely synchronize such actions to 
mass overwhelming effects at the decisive time and place.  
Synchronization often requires explicit coordination and rehearsals 
among participants. 
Versatility – Versatility is the ability of Army forces to meet the 
global, diverse mission requirements of full spectrum operations.  
Competence in a variety of missions and skills allows Army forces 
to quickly transition from one type of operation to another with 
minimal changes to the deployed force structure.  Versatility 
depends on adaptive leaders, competent and dedicated soldiers, 
and well-equipped units.  Effective training, high standards, and 
detailed planning also contribute.  Time and resources limit the 
number of tasks any unit can perform well.  Within these 
constraints, commanders maximize versatility by developing the 
multiple capabilities of units and soldiers.  Versatility contributes to 
the agility of Army units.  Versatility is a characteristic of 
multifunctional units.  Commanders can take advantage of this by 
knowing each unit’s capabilities and carefully tailoring forces for 
each mission.  At higher echelons, versatility implies the ability to 
assume more complex responsibilities. (pp.4-15 – 4-18) 
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These modern principles of war, as well as their associated tenets, vary little 
among the doctrinal publications produced and utilized by all the armed forces of 
the United States.  More importantly, these principles have remained very much 
the same as those officially adopted by the United States in 1921.  Yet, as we 
shall see in the final portion of this chapter, the nature of warfare has undergone 
radical change since then.  Following the end of the Cold War, the rate of change 
has increased further.  Jomini’s principles of war concepts lay at the root of the 
principles embraced by our modern military, but just as Lloyd’s conclusions about 
the science of warfare failed to bridge the gap between warfare in the age of 
Enlightenment and Napoleonic warfare (Paret, 1986, p.149), so too may Jomini’s 
concepts have become outdated in the face of the myriad complex 
circumstances and conditions inherent to the 21st century battlefield.   
 
C. THE SHIFTING SANDS OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
The nature of warfare during the age of Napoleon provided the 
background for Jomini’s development of his principles of war concepts and 
changed little despite the advent of the Industrial Age.  Despite numerous 
advancements in technology and weaponry, the American Civil War, World War 
I, and World War II all exhibited characteristics of warfare with which Jomini 
would have been familiar and comfortable.  Even the use of an atomic bomb by 
the United States against Japan would have done little to surprise the great 
military thinker.  As evidenced by J.D. Hittle in his introduction to Jomini’s 
Summary of the Art of War (1958), Jomini possessed tremendous vision and was 
able to foresee numerous advancements in how future wars would be waged.   
Jomini knew that henceforward Europe’s wars would be total wars.  
He also grasped the profound significance of Napoleon’s ability to 
wage war without heed to national boundaries or great distances, 
and realized the implications of Napoleonic expansive war in terms 
of military history yet to be made, stating that “remoteness is not a 
certain safeguard against invasion.”  …He was able to picture the 
coming wars in which rockets, shrapnel, and fast breech-loading 
field guns would be but a means of increasing the 
slaughter…Jomini was a prophet of the war to come.  It was not 
until the twentieth century that the war-frightened world seemed to 
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heed Jomini’s advice to limit the means of war by “laws of nations.”  
Only now is the world, shocked by the blasts at Nagasaki, 
Hiroshima and Bikini, coming to realize the full importance and 
dreadful implications of Jomini’s terse, somber prophesy:  “The 
means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful 
rapidity.” (Hittle, 1958, pp.34-35) 
However, even a visionary as great as Jomini has limits.  It is difficult to ascertain 
what Jomini would have done with the nuclear deterrent stalemate that emerged 
and effectively cast a pall over strategic thinking for decades.   
For the United States, there have been no full-scale, total wars since 
World War II.  Our nation’s armed forces, instead, have found themselves mired 
in a broad range of military endeavors that encompasses almost every aspect 
contained within the spectrum of conflict—major forays such as Korea and 
Vietnam; limited operations such as Grenada, Panama, Haiti, and Somalia; 
largely one-sided invasions such as Operation DESERT STORM, Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan), and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Iraq)—
and everything in between.  Only the Cold War provided the stage and had the 
potential to host that all-out, total war between super powers that Jomini 
envisioned.  Now, the center stage of modern warfare is occupied by the Global 
War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the complexities contained therein transcend any 
of those considered by Jomini when he developed his notion of the principles of 
war.  Just as Vietnam was a new kind of war with a plethora of new 
considerations and perplexing circumstances, so too is the complex nature of 
21st century warfare we face now and can expect to contend with well into the 
future.  The aforementioned Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was something 
rather unique in U.S. military history in that it was conducted primarily with 
special operations forces, focusing on unconventional warfare (UW), for nearly 
the first six months.  Operations of this nature, conducted with an emphasis on 
UW, may be more the norm than the exception in future wars.  This begs the 
question of whether our armed forces will seek to understand and readily make 
changes to address the complexities of modern warfare or respond--as the Army 
did in Vietnam—by adhering to the Army Concept (Krepinevich, 1986, p.4) in 
29 
which forces were trained and organized to coincide with the Army’s perception 
of how wars ought to be fought—which basically amounted to wishing away the 
realities of warfare that failed to conform to preconceived notions about mid-
intensity, conventional war.   
Vietnam and Korea, already a generation in the past, were the first major 
wars lost and/or terminated inconclusively by the United States.  War had 
changed significantly and unconventional warfare proved to be too much for our 
conventionally-minded armed forces.  But the principles of war used then are the 
same ones relied upon by our nation’s armed forces today.  Rather than conduct 
a thorough examination of the principles of war and make changes to our military 
to increase its capabilities with regard to this new breed of warfare, policy makers 
and military leaders within the higher echelons have chosen instead to refine the 
rules that govern when the United States would allow itself to become involved in 
war.   
These conditions, as formulated by people such as former Army 
Chief of Staff Gen. Edward C. “Shy” Meyer and Army War College 
strategist Col. Harry Summers and enunciated by Secretary of 
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, hold that U.S. combat forces 
should not be committed overseas unless the interests involved are 
vital to U.S. security, the troops committed are sufficient in number 
to accomplish the mission, and the American political leadership 
has “the clear intention of winning.”  Finally, they contend, an 
atmosphere of popular and congressional support for the war must 
be present.  These conditions are drawn, in Secretary Weinberger’s 
words, from “lessons we have learned from the past.”  To a great 
extent, they represent the Army’s lessons from Vietnam, and they 
signify the service’s determination to ensure that for it there will be 
“No More Vietnams.”  And yet, if one examines closely the 
resurgence of Army interest in low-intensity warfare, there exist 
many disturbing parallels between what transpired before the 
Vietnam War and what has happened since the war.  Indeed, the 
similarities drive the observer toward the ineluctable conclusion that 
if the Army has learned any lessons from Vietnam, it has learned 
many of the wrong ones. (Krepinevich, 1986, p.269) 
The complexities of the 21st century battlefield are many and conventional 
warfare has evolved into a new breed of its own.  Of particular concern is the 
growing predominance of unconventional warfare, guerrilla and terrorist tactics, 
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and insurgencies waged by fanatics who would like nothing better than to see the 
American giant toppled.  The next chapter will discuss this complexity and 
examine the modern principles of war with respect to these changing conditions 
in an effort to demonstrate that the principles of war are in need of change if we 




III. ARE JOMINI’S PRINCIPLES OF WAR STILL APPLICABLE? 
We have no right to assume that any physical laws exist, or if they 
have existed up until now, that they will continue to exist in a similar 
manner in the future. 
Max Planck 
 
A. DEFINING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Unconventional warfare (UW) is, by no means, a new phenomenon.  It 
has existed in a variety of forms throughout history, and its very origin coincided 
with that of basic human conflict.  From the campaigns of Alexander the Great 
and biblical accounts of partisan operations conducted by the Maccabees (Gann, 
1971) to the daring tactics of Colonel Marion during the American Revolution and 
the present-day guerrilla warfare utilized by insurgents in Iraq, UW has been 
demonstrated to be a resilient and lethal phenomenon with the potential to 
mystify and/or render helpless even the most robust and technologically superior 
conventional forces.   
This light armed people, relying more on their activity than on their 
strength, cannot struggle for the field of battle…[But] though 
defeated and put to flight one day, they are ready to resume the 
combat on the next, neither dejected by their loss nor their 
dishonour…they harass the enemy by embuscades and nightly 
sallies…Bold in the first onset, they cannot bear a repulse…[but] 
their courage manifests itself chiefly in retreat, when they frequently 
return, and, like the Parthians, shoot their arrows behind 
them…Neither oppressed by hunger or cold, nor fatigued by martial 
labours, nor despondent in adversity…they are as easy to 
overcome in a single battle, as difficult to subdue in a protracted 
war. (Cambrensis, 1908, pp.192-193) 
UW has been shown to be of great utility throughout many centuries and in 
various types of wars, but has always been difficult to define and/or categorize 
because of the vast array of methodologies through which it has been applied at 
different times, by numerous countries, and in a variety of locations throughout 
the globe.   
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Guerrilla operations moreover comprise a vast range of military 
actions that frequently overlap—colonial wars, social wars waged 
by one class against another, guerrilla wars between hostile tribes, 
or campaigns fought as an adjunct to major military operations, to 
name just a few. (Gann, 1971, p.1) 
Nevertheless, UW has endured and continues to evolve as a condition inherent 
to warfare.  Throughout history, there appears to be a common, multifold theme 
in UW that applies to even its most diverse applications:  operations always 
seem to occur in areas dominated by harsh terrain; guerrillas and/or insurgents 
are privy to key local knowledge and have obtained some measure of support 
from among the local populace; and guerrillas are more mobile than their 
opponents and prone to the use of hit-and-run tactics rather than prolonged, 
conventional engagements that naturally play to the strengths of their superior 
adversaries (Beckett, 2001).  At present, this theme appears to remain 
consistent, but at the same time, there are new challenges and an increasing 
complexity to warfare in general that continues to make UW somewhat difficult to 
define.   
 During the course of my research, I found Thomas K. Adams’s definition 
of UW to be an appropriate foundation on which to build my own, more inclusive 
definition for the purpose of analyzing the modern principles of war.  Adams 
defines UW in the following manner: 
Those military activities conducted within a conflict environment 
that are not directed toward or directly supporting conventional 
warfare, including humanitarian operations, complex emergencies, 
insurgency and counterinsurgency, some forms of subversion, 
sabotage and similar activities.  Intelligence gathering is an 
incidental function in most forms of UW.  UW is distinguished from 
conventional warfare chiefly by the fact that it does not seek to 
defeat or destroy enemy military forces in combat. (Adams, 1998, 
p.2) 
Although I deem this definition to be useful, it is merely a stepping stone en route 
to developing the notion that UW has become significantly more complex.  The 
advent of concepts such as cyber-war, cyber-terrorism, information warfare, and 
network-centric warfare, as well as others, has broadened the spectrum of 
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conflict and intricately obscured the dividing line between conventional warfare 
and UW.  The conditions and circumstances likely to be encountered on the 21st 
century battlefield will, in my judgment, be frequently categorized and viewed as 
UW because they will appear to transcend the traditionally accepted conventions 
of warfare.  For this reason, I have formulated my own definition of UW in such a 
way as to combine the aforementioned concepts, as well as others.  In doing so,  
my analysis of the modern principles of war will be more thorough because it will 
give proper consideration to these new and complex phenomena when 
determining whether the Jominian principles are still applicable.  My definition of 
UW combines aspects of the definitions previously formulated by Adams and the 
U.S. DOD (Department of Defense) with my own notions and reads as follows: 
Unconventional Warfare (UW)—author’s definition.  A broad spectrum of military, 
paramilitary, and civil operations, typically of long duration.  UW includes low-
intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, insurgency and counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism, cyber-warfare, cyber-terrorism, information warfare, counter-
criminal activities, stability and support operations (SASO), psychological 
operations, and other covert or clandestine operations, as well as indirect 
activities such as subversion and sabotage.  Intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination are paramount to UW.  Although UW may be distinguished from 
conventional warfare by the fact that it does not seek to defeat or destroy enemy 
military forces in combat, it may (and probably should) at times include activities 
which involve direct engagement with and the destruction of elements of a given 
adversary. 
From this point on, any discussion of UW will be in reference to this definition. 
 
B. GROWING COMPLEXITY AND TENDENCY TOWARD UW 
Martin van Creveld, in The Transformation of War (1991), provided 
intriguing insight with regard to the potential for enhanced complexity and 
growing propensity for waging UW on the 21st century battlefield.  In the chapter 
titled Future War, he wrote with frightening accuracy about the shape of things to 
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come in terms of potential adversaries, underlying causes, likely strategies and 
tactics, and the overall aims of waging war in the conflicts that appear destined to 
arise on the battlefields of tomorrow.  He writes, 
…nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign 
territorial units, or states, to fight each other in earnest without 
running the risk of mutual suicide…If fighting is to take place at all, 
then not only the armed forces but the political communities on 
whose behalf they operate will have to become intermingled.  If and 
when such intermingling takes place, it is very likely that the forces 
fielded by these communities will no longer be of the conventional 
kind…If states are decreasingly able to fight each other, then the 
concept of intermingling already points to the rise of low-intensity 
conflict as an alternative.  The very essence of such conflict 
consists in that it circumvents and undermines the trinitarian 
structure of the modern state, which is why that state in many ways 
is singularly ill-suited for dealing with this kind of war. (p.194) 
Of particular note is van Creveld’s emphasis on the increasing role of terrorism 
and criminal activity in future wars.  He eerily predicted the emergence of 
terrorist, guerrilla, and criminal organizations built upon foundations of charisma 
and motivated by ideological fanaticism (p.197).  With this emphasis in mind, van 
Creveld also pointed to the probability that the usually clear distinctions between 
combatants and non-combatants would become significantly blurred.   
As the spread of low-intensity conflict causes trinitarian structures 
to come tumbling down, however, strategy will focus on obliterating 
the existing line between those who fight and those who watch, 
pay, and suffer.  Hence probably the existing war convention will go 
by the board in this respect as well…war will become a much more 
direct experience for most civilians, even to the point where the 
term itself may be abolished, or its meaning altered.  War will affect 
people of all ages and both sexes.  They will be affected not just 
accidentally or incidentally or anonymously from afar, as in the case 
of strategic bombing, but as immediate participants, targets, and 
victims. (pp.202-203) 
One need only look to the attacks on the World Trade Center, the Bali hotel 
bombing, and the train bombings in Madrid, among others perpetrated by Al 
Qaeda and comparable terrorist organizations, to realize the frightening reality of 
van Creveld’s predictions.   
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 Despite the exemplary skill and accuracy with which van Creveld was able 
to describe the nature of war in the 21st century, there exist additional 
developments that exacerbate the growing complexity and unconventional aura 
that surrounds the modern battlefield.  Cyber-warfare, information warfare, 
globally-networked adversaries, and the eroding distinctions between war and 
crime are becoming increasingly important factors for consideration. 
 Cyber-warfare, despite having not yet been developed to its full potential, 
appears as if it will rapidly rise to a position of prominence with regard to modern 
warfare.  In Cyberwar Is Coming!, Arquilla and Ronfeldt explain the Cyberwar 
concept in the following manner: 
Cyberwar refers to conducting, and preparing to conduct, military 
operations according to information-related principles.  It means 
disrupting if not destroying the information and communications 
systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which 
an adversary relies in order to “know” itself:  who it is, where it is, 
what it can do when, why it is fighting, which threats to counter first, 
etc.  It means trying to know all about an adversary while keeping it 
from knowing much about oneself.  It means turning the “balance of 
information and knowledge” in one’s favor, especially if the balance 
of forces is not…This form of warfare may involve diverse 
technologies…It may also involve electronically blinding, jamming, 
deceiving, overloading, and intruding into an adversary’s 
information and communications circuits. (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 
1997, p.30) 
Given the rapid growth of technology, its ever-increasing availability, and the 
relatively low cost by which it can be obtained almost anywhere throughout the 
world, Cyberwar capability is not likely to be possessed and utilized solely by the 
United States and its allies.  As a result, states traditionally viewed as inferior 
and/or organizations such as Al Qaeda could potentially obtain the means to 
develop and utilize cyber-warfare to effectively nullify the force advantages that 
currently exist in the militaries of the nations they view as adversaries.  While the 
United States and its coalition partners may one day enjoy the ability to employ 
cyber-warfare across the broadest spectrum of its potential, I have little doubt 
that terrorists and other adversaries will use it as a potent force multiplier.  In 
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some cases, cyber-warfare may even serve as the “equalizer” that one day 
enables a terrorist enemy to defeat one of the world’s great powers. 
 Closely related to cyber-warfare, information warfare is quickly developing 
into a key aspect of waging war.  In the Fourth Edition of Strategy and Force 
Planning (2004), Martin van Creveld contributed an article titled The 
Transformation of War Revisited (2001).  Having the advantage of hindsight, he 
went back to his original work, The Transformation of War (1991), and 
summarized the ways that many of his writings and predictions had come to 
fruition.  Simultaneously, he identified his failure to address information warfare 
as the “greatest single shortcoming” (p.618) of his book.  In simple terms, 
information warfare is the use of information as a weapon in itself.  This concept 
is critical in terms of the 21st century battlefield because “modern societies and 
their armed forces are extraordinarily dependent on information and becoming 
more so with each passing day” (p.618).  Computers are utilized and, in many 
cases, serve as the main source of control for a majority of the systems that run 
most of the functions inherent to daily life in both the civilian and military realms.  
With so many of these computers invariably linked by way of a vast array of 
networks, defending against information warfare is extremely difficult.   
In information warfare, both geographical space and time are 
irrelevant.  Attacks scarcely require a base and can be directed at 
any point from any other point regardless of distance.  Thus 
understood, such warfare would appear to be a leveler.  Especially 
when compared with conventional war…it favors the small against 
the large.  This will be even more true if the attacker does not strike 
roots at any particular place but retains his mobility instead.  Rather 
than waiting for the government-sent special weapons and tactics 
(SWAT) team to find him and strike at him, he should be capable of 
easily packing up his equipment and going somewhere else. 
(p.619) 
Because of their distinct advantage with regard to mobility, van Creveld asserts 
that information warfare is likely to be pursued by non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups.  Such adversaries, with little or none of their own infrastructure 
to be concerned with, can improvise and adapt to their circumstances and 
surroundings at any given time without any significant degradation to their 
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information warfare capabilities.  These conditions give further credence to the 
growing influence of information warfare and the apparent shift away from 
conventional war towards UW and low-intensity conflict (p.620).  Further 
discussions of cyber-warfare, information warfare, and cyber-terrorism, as well as 
the ways they contribute to the increasing complexity of the 21st century 
battlefield, can be found in Verton’s Black Ice (2003), Libicki’s What Is 
Information Warfare? (1995), and Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s Networks and Netwars 
(2001). 
 Yet another factor of considerable consternation when examining the 
intricacies of 21st century warfare is the complex, networked organizational 
structures that, thus far, have appeared to be most advantageous for our 
enemies.  Take, for example, the globally-networked structure of the Al Qaeda 
terrorist organization.  In Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia (2005), 
Zachary Abuza presents a good overview of Al Qaeda that serves to provide a 
decent appreciation for the complex nature of this adversary.  Osama Bin Laden 
established this terrorist group in 1988, with the assistance of key individuals 
within Saudi Arabian intelligence, for the purpose of orchestrating Arab 
recruitment for the mujahideen.  From this we can assert that networking was an 
integral part of Bin Laden’s repertoire from the very beginning.  Built upon a 
small, core leadership consisting of a mere 30 individuals, the organization 
functions via a potent international network of approximately 24 constituent 
groups with cells dispersed throughout at least 60 different countries across the 
globe.  Core Al Qaeda membership is estimated to be somewhere in the 
neighborhood of  5000 to 12000 – strong (Smith, 2005, p.41).  Above and 
beyond the establishment of its own terrorist cells, Al Qaeda has also found 
success in co-opting additional groups with individual domestic agendas and 
incorporating them into the organization’s overall structure.  Upon pledging 
allegiance to Bin Laden, these groups then enjoy the benefits of shared 
intelligence, funding, logistics, and newly recruited membership.  Too small to 
undertake any major operations of their own, the underlying strength of the cells 
is the network itself.  Al Qaeda has demonstrated an aptitude for mobilizing 
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individual cells as necessary and/or creating new cells in various regions 
throughout the world.  With growing regularity, these cells are then capitalizing on 
the strength of the organization’s global network to coordinate and support their 
individual efforts (p.30).  In an April 2005 briefing at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), Dr. Marc Sageman provided graphics that portray the complicated 
array of network linkages of which the Al Qaeda terrorist organization is 
composed.  See Figure 3-1 below. 
 
Figure 3-1:  The Al Qaeda Network 
 (From:  Global Salafi Jihad: Empirical Assessment & Social Network Analysis, 
presented by Dr. Marc Sageman at NPS, April 2005) 
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To say that such an organizational structure is complex and daunting would be a 
considerable understatement.  In Lesser’s Countering the New Terrorism (1999), 
Dr. John Arquilla effectively describes the Al Qaeda organization as follows: 
…diverse, dispersed nodes who share a set of ideas and interests 
and who are arrayed to act in a fully internetted ‘all-channel’ 
manner…the network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) 
has little to no hierarchy, and there may be multiple leaders.  
Decision-making and operations are decentralized, allowing for 
local initiative and autonomy.  Thus, the design may appear 
acephalous (headless), and at other times polycephalous (hydra-
headed). (p.49) 
To date, we have made a fair amount of progress in our efforts to understand, 
dissect, and counteract the creative web of nodes and channels that conceals 
our adversary.  But our opponent has proven to be a quick study, constantly 
analyzing his successes and failures and making changes as necessary to 
enhance the potential that subsequent operations will be properly executed.  
Without a doubt, every step we make toward dismantling our enemy’s 
organizational network is likely to be two steps behind his ongoing efforts to 
refine and strengthen the bastions that so masterfully conceal his every activity. 
 Also of note as a growing concern is the rapidly shrinking gap that has 
traditionally separated war and criminal activity.  In Terrorism and Violence in 
Southeast Asia (2005), Tamara Makarenko’s article on terrorism and 
transnational organized crime (TOC) elucidates the insidious nature of this 
emerging threat.  She writes, 
…it has become increasingly evident that the greatest threat to 
security emanates from the rapidly evolving phenomena of 
terrorism and transnational organized crime (TOC).  In actuality, 
national, regional, and international experience with insecurity over 
the past decade has confirmed that terrorism and TOC deserve 
paramount attention precisely because they both span national 
boundaries and thus are necessarily multidimensional and 
organized; and, because they directly threaten the stability of states 
by targeting economic, political, and social systems. (p.169) 
The frequency with which terrorist groups and criminal organizations are 
coordinating and combining their efforts to obtain much-needed resources and 
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further their interests is increasing at an astonishing rate.  For example, 
conditions of instability, exacerbated by the growing influence of terrorism, in 
various regions throughout the world have provided a foothold for criminal 
organizations who seek to expand their operations and exert political influence.  
Concurrently, terrorist organizations are skillfully wielding the sword of religious 
ideology to bolster support and develop stronger ties in the realm of criminal 
activity (pp.169-170).  In what she refers to as the “Crime-Terror Continuum 
(CTC),” Makarenko asserts that 
…the differences commonly identified between organized crime 
and terrorism are currently defunct.  When assessing contemporary 
security threats, the reality is that it has become increasingly 
difficult to distinguish between political and criminal motivations. 
(p.173) 
The convergence of these once separate phenomena could further complicate 
the friction and uncertainty that surrounds our adversaries on the 21st century 
battlefield because economic and political considerations will need to be 
entertained, in addition to purely military objectives, to an even greater degree 
than has been the case previously.   
…military and economic functions will be reunited.  Individual glory, 
profit, and booty gained directly at the expense of the civilian 
population will once again become important, not simply as 
incidental rewards but as legitimate objectives of war. (van Creveld, 
1991, p.216) 
At the same time, enhanced connections between terrorist and criminal 
organizations my provide valuable opportunities for the United States to infiltrate, 
gather timely intelligence on, and ultimately apprehend and defeat large chunks 
of the enemy’s networks.  Our willingness to quickly recognize and proactively 
pursue this evolving threat will be a key factor in determining our success or 





C. VIEWING JOMINI’S PRINCIPLES THROUGH THE UW “LENS” 
With what I hope to be a greater appreciation for--as well as a better 
understanding of the emergence of--the aforementioned considerations, 
combined with my more inclusive definition of UW, we can now pursue an 
analysis of the modern principles of war.  Picture, if you will, the notion of UW 
and the growing complexity of the 21st century battlefield as a lens through which 
the principles of war can be projected and subsequently analyzed in terms of 
their continued applicability.  See Figure 3-2 below. 
 




The bold question mark on the right of Figure 3-2 should serve to indicate that 
there exists some degree of uncertainty with regard to the continued applicability 
of the modern principles of war.  I turn, once again, to van Creveld’s The 
Transformation of War (1991) in which he writes, 
Like a man who has been shot in the head but still manages to 
stagger forward a few paces, conventional war may be at its last 
gasp.  As low-intensity conflict rises to dominance, much of what 
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Jomini’s understanding of strategy was specific to the era during which he 
amassed his wealth of military knowledge and experience.  As a result, many of 
the conditions and circumstances inherent to the 21st century battlefield were not 
realistic considerations for him to factor in when developing the principles of war.  
This is precisely why, as we move on to the next chapter to examine the 
applicability, or lack thereof, of the modern principles, we do so with my new 
definition of UW and the complexities of modern combat as the key components 
of the “lens” we utilize for our scrutiny.  The Commandant of the United States 
Marine Corps, General M. W. Hagee, articulated the importance of evaluating the 
very principles by which we are guided during our efforts to wage war, as well as 
the need to develop a willingness to change said principles if, by such evaluation, 
we are able to conclude this to be a prudent measure.  In the foreword of Small 
Wars/21st Century (2005), he writes, 
Traditional and irregular adversaries will continue to generate a 
wide range of complex and ambiguous challenges.  Their structure 
and operating style will not be readily reduced to a simple template.  
Nor will future adversaries array themselves in convenient linear 
formations nor contemplate set piece traditional operations against 
us…The challenge before us is to successfully meet tomorrow’s 
uncertain security through continuous learning and adaptation.  The 
emerging security environment demands we sharpen our focus on 
this increasingly likely form of warfare and adapt to its new 
characteristics…the political, security, and economic consequences 
of this mode of war will be high.  They are the converse of past 
wars, and the emergence of low frequency/high amplitude war has 
serious implications for our doctrine, training, education and 









…nothing is less conducive to the successful waging of armed 
conflict than to take the existing convention for granted.  A system 
of thought that ignores the war convention altogether, like vom 
Kriege and its successors, cannot fail to misrepresent the nature of 
armed conflict. 
Martin van Creveld, from The Transformation of War 
 
A. WHICH PRINCIPLES ARE STILL APPLICABLE? 
By viewing the modern principles of war through the UW “Lens” I have 
determined the following principles to be of continued applicability to the complex 
nature of warfare on the 21st century battlefield:  Objective, Offensive, Economy 
of force, Maneuver, Unity of command, and Security.  My justification for making 
such a determination concerning these six principles is as follows: 
Objective 
Clear goals and a thorough understanding of the required/desired end-
state is vital to success in warfare.  Complexity on the 21st century battlefield is 
multi-faceted and the objectives contained therein are more complicated than 
ever before.  Overarching, strategic objectives must be understood at all levels 
and tactical objectives must be viewed in terms of how they impact the big 
picture.  More so than in previous eras, every potential effect of an objective’s 
attainment must be carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it will support 
or impede the desired outcome of a given campaign or strategic initiative.  
Essentially, objectives are becoming inherently deeper and/or broader.  Instead 
of simply seizing and occupying a piece of terrain, now and in the future one 
must give careful consideration to the second and third-order effects of doing so.  
How will it affect the attitudes of the local population?  Will doing so interfere with 
regular activities vital to the local economy?  Failure to think in these terms could 
likely result in growing support for the adversary and the emergence of barriers 
that significantly impede the ability to accomplish the overall mission.  
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Additionally, if we are to successfully counter our highly-networked enemies, it is 
imperative that we maximize the autonomy, creative initiative, and the ability to 
act in a timely manner of units at every level.  To do so with confidence, 
objectives must be carefully chosen and disseminated in order to ensure that 
vital opportunities at the tactical level can be rapidly exploited in support of the 
main objective.  If we can somehow implement a network approach ourselves in 
the effort to combat our adversaries, there is perhaps significant potential that 
doing so will allow us to pursue a greater number of objectives than in the past. 
Offensive 
Future warfare will likely be won by those who maintain the offensive.  
Forces that are proactive and in constant pursuit of the enemy will enjoy a 
greater advantage than those who content themselves with reacting and 
responding to an elusive foe.  The former will constantly seek out new and 
innovative methods for maintaining the upper hand while simultaneously striking 
the adversary in a pre-emptive manner to keep him continually off balance.  The 
latter will waste precious manpower and resources in an effort to keep up with an 
enemy who consistently succeeds in setting the pace of battle.  The likely 
adversaries in the 21st century will be mobile, well-networked fighters able to drift 
in and out of both the global and local surrounding population at will.  Failure to 
adhere to this principle will result in war being fought on the enemy’s terms.  
Such an approach to warfare on tomorrow’s battlefield will likely mean defeat for 
even the most robust and technologically superior armies.  This presents 
implications for our current, strategically defensive, stance with regard to 
homeland defense, as well as for our defensive approach in most of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. With regard to the former, our administration’s emphasis on 
preemption, the notion that the best defense is a good offense, is a step in the 
right direction, but will have to be utilized with great caution and in a very 
calculated manner.  It may not be easy to determine the true identities of our foes 
in the future and, subsequently, could result in a decreased ability to preempt 
with overwhelming force.  Significant adjustments will need to be made to provide 
us with a wide range of flexible, but highly effective preemption options.  As far 
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as current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are concerned, the successes of 
reasonably well-coordinated offensives in Iraq, although varied in magnitude and 
often quite limited, may be the start of a positive trend.  Accordingly, our forces 
have continued to pursue such operations with increasing frequency.  Positive 
results  and more substantial successes achieved consistently may lead our 
forces to pursue a similar approach in Afghanistan as well.   In the end, 
recognition of and a willingness to embrace the advantages inherent to offensive 
operations may prove to be vital to our pursuit of victory in both of these 
troublesome conflicts. 
Economy of Force 
The unpredictability and widely-dispersed nature of probable enemies in 
future wars significantly enhances the priority that should be given to this 
principle.  Prudent use of one’s forces with this principle in mind could support a 
more indirect, multi-pronged, simultaneous advance against the enemy thereby 
requiring him to defend multiple objectives all at once.  Even more important, if 
we conduct our attack in terms of simultaneous strikes against multiple areas of 
an adversary’s operational continuum, and do so repeatedly over time, the 
outcome could prove to be quite beneficial.  For example, consider simultaneous 
attacks using cyber-warfare, information warfare, police raids, guerrilla warfare 
tactics, sabotage, and precision-guided munitions (PGM) against a terrorist 
network’s computer systems, local support, criminal linkages, individual cell ‘safe 
houses’, and key leadership figures respectively.  Success in any one of these 
areas would likely be of little consequence, but over time, continued application 
of such pressure would likely result in successes being achieved against multiple 
targets.  Repeated evolutions would likely weaken the enemy’s organization 
sufficiently enough to severely hamper or degrade his overall operational 
capabilities.  In terms of the Powell Doctrine, which places high emphasis on 
overwhelming force to defeat the enemy, some degree of reinterpretation may 
have to be pursued.  I submit that, despite involving attacks that are not 
necessarily military in nature, future emphasis on Economy of Force in this vein 
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will enable us to bring a newer, broader, and more potent breed of overwhelming 
force to bear against our adversaries. 
Maneuver 
This principle maintains a high level of importance and applicability largely 
due to the fact that it is intimately related to Offensive and Economy of force.  
Going back to they way it is defined in FM 3-0, Maneuver involves the dynamic 
and flexible application of various elements which, when effectively combined 
with other principles, can be a vital contributor to efforts specifically directed at 
keeping an adversary off-balance and in a largely reactive mode.  Utilized 
efficiently, this principle can turn the tables in our favor such that we become 
more unpredictable than our enemy and better able to counteract his strategic 
moves via a greater degree of flexibility.  That being said, Maneuver should not 
only be viewed in terms of a traditional “Blitzkrieg” mindset.  Instead of only 
concerning ourselves with the dynamic and flexible application of purely military 
elements, the future will demand that we view this principle in terms of the sum 
total of all the elements and innovations inherent to future wars.  Skillful 
Maneuver within the realms of “cyber-warfare,” “information-warfare,” and 
“networks,” in combination with the physical movement of forces throughout the 
battlespace, could result in an enabling effect for our forces that will be daunting. 
Unity of Command 
Considering that potential adversaries in future wars are likely to depend 
on globally-dispersed and networked organizational structures with little direct 
command, the United States and its allies will be required to conduct operations 
via a system of multi-national coalitions if they expect to pursue, engage, and/or 
counteract the enemy, simultaneously in multiple regions, with any degree of 
consistency.  With such an approach, we are reminded of the previous 
discussion regarding the continued applicability of Objective.  Maintaining a clear 
focus on the overall desired end-state becomes a tremendously difficult endeavor 
when the theater and final outcome of actions conducted therein are in terms of 
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global scale.  Viewed in this perspective, it becomes abundantly clear why “unity 
of  effort”  is  used  synonymously  with  this  principle.  Joint Publication (JP) 3-0,  
Doctrine for Joint Operations (2001), highlights the difficulties likely to be 
encountered with Unity of command when conducting operations on so large a 
scale. 
In these operations, other government agencies often may have the 
lead.  Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an 
ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian 
organization.  Command relationships often may be only loosely 
defined and many times will not involve command authority as 
understood within the military.  This arrangement may require 
commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve 
objectives by unity of effort.  Military commanders need to consider 
how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, 
economic, and informational in nature.  Because operations often 
will be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels 
understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary 
and counterproductive friction. (p.V-2) 
The pursuit and potential implementation of a networked approach to warfare, 
essentially “fighting fire with fire” in the sense that we might best be able to 
combat our future adversaries with globally-dispersed, networked forces of our 
own, may permit a more distributed approach to Unity of command.  We may be 
able to field a complex network of small, highly autonomous, and extremely 
capable units that, with a clear understanding of the overall mission, could 
engage the enemy with the utmost in speed and agility.  Much like the foes of 
tomorrow, our forces would require little to no direct command—just an intimate 
knowledge of the desired end state and a thorough appreciation for the full depth 
and breadth of the objectives they prosecute.  Here again, “unity of effort” takes 
on greater meaning because all members of the network will need to maintain 
the highest regard for the overarching goal and ensure that their individual unit 
efforts compliment rather than counteract one another.  Regardless of which term 





 Defined in FM 3-0 (2001) as, “never permitting the enemy to acquire an 
unexpected advantage,” it would appear that this principle is more applicable 
than ever.  The unpredictable nature of the enemy, combined with a veritable 
plethora of mechanisms with which he could launch a wide variety of harmful 
attacks, makes this principle vital to success in warfare.  The potential damage 
that could be inflicted by asymmetric threats is overwhelming.  Above and 
beyond physical attacks conducted by human beings who remain hidden within 
the local population until a given time, the attacks that could be launched via 
cyber-warfare have added an entirely new dimension to the concept of security.  
Take, for example, the notion of a cyber-attack that shuts down power and/or 
communications in a major city in close coordination with the detonation of a 
“dirty bomb” or similar weapon of mass destruction (WMD).  The resulting 
tragedy would be devastating—not just in terms of the loss of human life, but with 
regard to the severe blow suffered by the economic and political systems of the 
country in which the event occurs as well.  This is just one of many examples that 
lead me to assess security as being a principle of war that is most likely to 
endure scrutiny for generations to come. 
 
B. WHICH PRINCIPLES HAVE DIMINISHED APPLICABILITY? 
Although the majority of the modern principles of war appear to be 
relatively unchanged and seemingly retain their applicability to the 21st century 
battlefield when viewed through the UW “lens,” there are a few which I have 
deemed to be somewhat less fortunate.  Mass, Surprise, and Simplicity are three 
of the modern principles of war that, in my determination, have become 
significantly less applicable and may even deserve to be replaced in light of the 
changing conditions and growing complexity of future war. 
Mass 
Jomini considered Mass to be a fundamental principle of war.  However, 
application of this principle to the conditions inherent to 21st century warfare 
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could be, at best, extremely problematic.  The enemy has already shown a 
willingness and uncanny ability to strike with a significant degree of speed, agility, 
and audacity to maximize the death and destruction he leaves in his wake.  He 
does this where and when it is least expected and with methods that minimize his 
own risk.  As we have seen time and again in Iraq, our massed formations as 
small as three and four-vehicle convoys have been successfully engaged using 
remotely detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and/or suicide bombers 
with explosive-filled vehicles.  The resulting casualties and destroyed equipment 
has almost always been in favor of the enemy.  In terms of the growing number 
of asymmetric threats, Mass would appear to be detrimental as well.  A nearly 
undetectable enemy who willingly blends with the local population while in 
possession of a potent capability to manufacture and deliver various types of 
bombs can get close enough to pose a viable and deadly threat to major choke 
points.  Our troop and equipment concentrations at major ports, regional air 
bases, and forward-deployed intermediate staging bases (ISBs) provide lucrative 
targets for remotely-detonated devices and/or “human” bombs (Schneider, 2005, 
p.5). 
The current U.S. military definition of Mass is in terms of massing the 
effects of combat power.  As summarized by Paul Murdock in Principles of War 
on the Network-Centric Battlefield: Mass and Economy of Force (2002), 
The effects massed are primarily those of “fires” (modes of 
delivering weaponry against an enemy, usually at long range and 
having an operational-level effect upon the enemy)—lethal and 
nonlethal, direct or indirect—seeking to disrupt, divert, delay, or 
destroy enemy forces or information systems…The effects are what 
is important.  The goal of war is to achieve political goals by using 
organized violence to influence the mind and behavior of the enemy 
leadership…To mass effects that do not contribute to this end is to 
practice poor operational art. (p.3) 
This effects-based approach will prove to be extremely complicated, if not 
altogether impossible, to carry out with any degree of success against an 
adversary who is widely dispersed and intermingled with the civilian population.  
Even the use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) will not be sufficient to 
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adequately mitigate the inherent risk of killing scores of innocent non-combatants 
involved when engaging the enemy in this fashion.  Adherence to this principle 
as it is currently defined will likely result in collateral damage that only serves to 
strengthen the enemy’s information campaign efforts counter to our cause.  
 The devaluation of Mass as a modern principle of war could have serious 
doctrinal and organizational implications for our armed forces.  Taken to the 
extreme, it could result in the dissolution of our armored divisions, the retirement 
of a significant portion of our conventional bomber fleet, downsizing of our 
ballistic missile submarine stocks, the complete overhaul of our current military 
organizational structures, etc..  However, we cannot go to such extremes just yet.  
All out, conventional warfare is and will likely continue to be an infrequent 
occurrence, but far from an impossibility.  Hence, the challenges ahead involve 
training, equipping, and organizing our forces to become extremely flexible.  
They will need to be adept at meeting and defeating cunning, new adversaries 
while simultaneously maintaining the ability to fight and vanquish a traditionally-
arrayed opponent.  Can we realistically field such an agile and capable force?  
Yes, we can.  The task will be far from easy, but it will be essential. 
 Surprise 
 The decreased applicability of this principle for U.S. forces is largely the 
result of what is currently referred to as the “Information-Based Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA)” (Litton, 2000, p.1).  Of significant impact when achieved, 
but difficult to obtain, Surprise is defined as “striking the enemy at a time or place 
or in a manner for which he is unprepared” (FM 3-0, 2001, p.4-14).  With the 
basic nature of this new RMA being that information receipt, transmittal, and 
overall utilization is accelerating rapidly, Surprise will be more difficult for our 
forces to achieve given the greatly enhanced battlefield awareness maintained 
by all sides in a given conflict.  Our likely adversaries have already demonstrated 
their abilities to skillfully utilize information as a form of warfare and as a force 
multiplier to assist them in eroding the traditional advantages enjoyed by 
numerically and technologically superior forces.  Litton (2001) argues that, 
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If we are engaging an adversary who has not mastered the 
information-based RMA, the principle of surprise could be an 
important aspect of the way we will employ force…by achieving 
information dominance early on in the conflict, we will be able to 
“see” and “engage” the enemy’s forces, while denying him that 
same capability.  This ability to “surprise at will” may cause the 
enemy to withdraw or surrender simply by communicating to him 
that “we know where you are.” (p.7) 
I submit that, despite our technological advantages, the enemy has, thus far, 
exhibited a better grasp of the emerging RMA than has the United States.  If the 
war in Iraq and the hunt for Al Qaeda are any indication, it would appear that our 
adversary is better able to “see,” “engage,” and “surprise at will” and is, in fact, 
denying us the same capabilities.  For example, not only are Iraqi insurgents 
continuously attacking U.S. convoys with remotely-detonated IEDs, but also 
filming the attacks from concealed positions nearby and then broadcasting the 
terrifying footage via the internet.  One should also note the Surprise achieved by 
terrorists in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the train bombings in 
Madrid.  In each of these instances, it is we—not the enemy—who are being 
attacked at a time, place, and in a manner for which we are unprepared. 
 An additional factor that erodes the applicability of Surprise to U.S. forces 
in future conflicts is the ever-growing presence of the media in and around the 
21st century battlefield.  Networks such as CNN are willing and able to broadcast 
the horrors of war, via the internet and television, almost as soon as they occur.  
Friendly force information, to include approximate troop strengths, unit types, and 
general plans for maneuver and engagement are broadcast world-wide with little 
or no concern for operational security (OPSEC).   
 Simplicity 
 Currently defined in terms of “preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and 
clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding” (FM 3-0, 2001, p.4-15), I 
feel rather strongly that this principle is unnecessary.  To address the necessity 
of formulating plans, orders, and operations concepts that are clear and easily 
executable by even the lowest level subordinates, I see no reason whatsoever 
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why Simplicity has not been categorized as an operational tenet rather than as 
one of the modern principles of war.  It may be argued that the growing trend 
toward coalition warfare, as well as the greater number of operations involving 
non-governmental and interagency organizations, will increase the need to 
emphasize Simplicity.  I agree with the need for greater emphasis, but still do not 
believe that an enhanced need for simple plans and concepts should elevate 
Simplicity to a status other than that of a key tenet of operations.  In direct 
contrast, “complexity” may be emerging as the real principle of 21st century 
warfare.  I will discuss this notion in greater detail as we move ahead to the next 
section of this chapter. 
 It is important to keep in mind that my determinations concerning the 
decreased applicability of these three principles are based on my own, individual 
interpretations of what challenges await our forces on the battlefield of tomorrow.  
I have no doubt that some will view my findings as arguable or even ludicrous, 
but if I have at least encouraged some to think more intensely about these 
principles, then I am pleased.  Before finalizing your judgment on the matter, let 
me offer some additional observations to contemplate. 
 
C. ARE THERE “NEW” PRINCIPLES TO CONSIDER? 
Rather than simply suggest that some of the modern principles of war may 
not be applicable in the future and leave it at that, I would like instead to suggest 
that there may, in fact, be “new” principles to consider as either replacements for 
or additions to the list of principles currently in use.  I am proposing that 
Networking, Flexibility, Complexity, and Cultural Understanding, while at first 
glance appearing to be somewhat foreign to traditional military thinking, may be 
concepts worthy of inclusion in the principles of war that guide us on the 21st 
century battlefield.   
Networking & Flexibility 
Given the complex, networked structure preferred by our current 
adversary and likely to be replicated in varying degrees by our future enemies, 
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these concepts could potentially provide our forces with greatly enhanced 
capabilities in support of engaging and defeating their opponents. The 
battlespace of the 21st century has expanded significantly.  Many of our 
adversaries utilize terrorist tactics and operate in such a way as to 
simultaneously carry out devastating attacks in distinctly different locations 
throughout the globe.  Essentially, the battlespace that could once be defined by 
geography and/or borders, as well as managed and understood in terms of finite, 
controllable areas, has reached a level of magnitude that is now synonymous 
with the globe itself.  Networking is vital then if we are to maintain and/or improve 
our ability to manage and control so vast an area.  To effectively cover the globe 
in order to promptly preempt and/or react to multiple terrorist attacks, we must 
develop strong networks with indigenous populations throughout the world.  
Doing so will permit us to obtain more timely intelligence about our adversaries,  
allow for wider dissemination of our intent, and enable us to augment our forces 
with indigenous forces such that combat power can be injected decisively and 
expeditiously.   
United States military forces are designed to attack rather than defend; be 
proactive rather than reactive in their combat endeavors.  The inclusion of 
Networking and Flexibility as modern principles provides significant potential for 
benefit.  Network utilization within our force structures, as well as between our 
forces and those of other countries, can enhance the flow of intelligence in such 
a way as to preserve our abilities to remain proactive against our enemies.  
Through the continuous exchange and sharing of information we will not only 
maximize our opportunities to seize the initiative against our adversaries, but 
expand our capabilities as well with regard to staying ahead of our opponents 
and creating flexible options with which to sustain our momentum against them. 
The wealth of intelligence and information available as a result could allow us to 
formulate and implement more comprehensive and flexible maneuver schemes. 
Missions could be executed more quickly and decisively while a networked array 
of logistical nodes supports our maneuvering forces.   
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Networking could provide key planners and decision-makers with an 
enhanced visibility of battlespace circumstances and conditions as a result of the 
increase in timely information and intelligence.  Improved continuity between 
elements of multi-national coalitions, as well as between front-line and rear-
echelon units, could greatly diminish uncertainty regarding who is in control and 
subsequently allow forces to maintain a sharper focus on the overall objective.   
The significant improvement in the flow of information and intelligence 
obtained via Networking will be vital to the determination of appropriate 
measures required to ensure effective force protection.  Through the inclusion of 
indigenous populations in the “network” scheme, significantly higher levels of 
human intelligence (HUMINT) would be available and could serve to provide a 
more accurate picture of the enemy threat.  For operational security (OPSEC) 
purposes, Networking would allow greater Flexibility in terms of leaders being 
able to maximize or minimize the network scope as necessary in order to control 
and monitor the flow of key information and intelligence. 
Efficiently-linked forces could be maximized or minimized as required to 
ensure effective employment in terms of time, location, and force strength.  By 
the same virtue, the network supporting said forces could be expanded or shrunk 
down as necessary to provide optimum efficiency levels.  Information and 
intelligence provided by the network would provide planners with greater 
accuracy when determining force requirements for areas of interest (AIs) within 
the battlespace.  Related to this benefit, enhanced intelligence about the 
adversary gained through Networking would minimize his deception efforts and 
prevent our forces from misconstruing enemy strengths and capabilities. 
Networking could potentially provide our forces with the ability to identify, 
plan for, and engage key objectives earlier on in any given conflict.  Well-
connected networks incorporating military forces and indigenous populations 
would provide better information about potential objectives and allow for greater 




My recommendation for this concept to be considered as a potential 
principle of war stems from the assumption that the multitude of potential 
adversaries in future wars will likely rely on complex, networked structures with 
which to support their operations.  The antithesis of Simplicity, which I 
downgraded previously as being more suitable for categorization as an 
operational tenet than as a principle of war by way of its current definition, 
Complexity does not refer to the construct of our warfighting plans, orders, and 
concepts.  Instead, I am suggesting that we consider adopting this principle as it 
pertains to our own force structures.  Intimately related to Networking, I submit 
that we will be better postured to oppose and defeat a complex, networked 
adversary if we, ourselves, have arrayed our forces in a complex, networked 
manner that causes him to view us as an agile, unpredictable, flexible, and truly 
formidable opponent.  Currently, our forces utilize clearly-defined, easily-
discerned, hierarchical structures.  What if the obvious suddenly became 
ambiguous and our adversary lacked visibility of our centers of gravity?  Better 
still is the notion that our resulting complex and widespread organization could 
make it nearly impossible for an adversary to conduct its activities without us 
knowing about them in advance and thwarting their every move.   
Some examples of the efforts to pursue measures that lean toward an 
enhanced complexity with regard to our own force structures and doctrine are the 
concepts of network-centric warfare and swarming.  The former, as described by 
Cebrowski and Garstka in Proceedings (1998) and summarized by Paul Murdock 
in Parameters (2002), is based upon a system of three grids known as the 
“sensor grid,” the “information grid,” and the “transaction (engagement) grid.”  
The first of these grids can be envisioned as a wide array of sensor technologies 
such as optical devices, HUMINT sources, infrared receivers, and a variety of 
radar dispersed globally and deployed throughout the air, space, land, and 
maritime domains.  These sensor technologies would be both static and dynamic 
in their application.  The concept for the second, information-based, grid involves 
a vast, largely-static, network of communications devices such as satellites, 
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computers, data-transmission media, and the like.  This network would function, 
in large part, to transmit data collected by the numerous sensor technologies. 
 
The information grid would transmit sensor information, 
recommendations and orders, intelligence, and real-time 
information about operations, logistics, and other functions—
information needed by leaders at all levels to plan, monitor, and 
control operations more effectively, efficiently, and responsively. 
(Murdock, 2002, p.4) 
The third and final “transaction grid,” would compile the data provided through 
the “sensor” and “information” grids to effectively marry available means of 
engagement with identified targets and provide precision guidance for these 
systems to maximize their accuracy and lethality.   
 Although this concept is not yet a reality, it is a vital step in the right 
direction.  The technological challenges associated with pursuing such an 
endeavor are daunting, but by no means insurmountable.  More challenging still 
are the sweeping changes to existing military doctrine that will have to be made 
in the course of transforming the idea of network-centric warfare into a functional 
operational capability (p.4).   
 Swarming, a concept introduced by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2000), is closely 
related to network-centric warfare in that is highly dependent upon networks, 
places a keen emphasis on information, and will involve major doctrinal changes 
if it is to be implemented as a true capability or our future warfighters.  The 
authors define this innovative theory as follows: 
…a seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, 
and strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a 
sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from 
stand-off positions—will work best, and perhaps will only work, if it 
is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, 
dispersed, networked maneuver units (referred to as “pods” 
organized in “clusters”).  Swarming cannot work if it is based on 
traditional mass or maneuver formations.  These swarm units are 
not only internetted with each other, but also can coordinate and 
call upon other assets in the area.  To achieve this, swarming 
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depends upon the operation of a vast, integrated sensory system 
that can distribute not only specific targeting information but also 
overall topsight about conditions in and around the battlespace. 
(Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2000, p.45) 
Regardless of the difficulties involved, persistent efforts to achieve such bold 
innovations will ensure our forces are prepared and equipped to overcome the 
challenges of the 21st century battlefield.  Complexity then may be a key factor in 
the way our forces wage war in the future.  Perhaps the doctrinal changes that 
occur as a result should accordingly embrace it as a new principle of war. 
 Cultural Understanding 
 My regard for culture and its many facets as an important consideration 
when determining the principles of war for the future stems from the detailed 
emphasis it receives in the U.S. Marine manual, Small Wars/21st Century (2005).  
The elements that effect how the population of a given nation, region, or territory 
involved in war thinks and what drives them to action must be clearly understood 
by our fighting forces if we are to conduct operations throughout the world with 
any degree of success.  The pursuit of a globally-networked adversary, the 
growing emphasis on multi-national coalitions, and the low-intensity conflicts with 
which we are likely to find ourselves predominantly engaged all combine to make 
it essential for us to obtain and maintain a thorough understanding of different 
cultures if we are to effectively grasp the complex nature of the strategic 
environment.   A concerted effort to understand the attitudes, language, religion, 
customs, lifestyles, and economies of different populations, as well as other 
factors that drive said people to think and act differently than those of us 
accustomed to traditional “Western” thinking, can do much to facilitate the 
success of military operations.  Conversely, the deliberate decision to ignore 
these factors could significantly impede the efforts of our forces and transform 
realistic expectations of victory into largely unattainable goals.   
In such an environment, an understanding of the culture can mean 
the difference between success and failure.  Seemingly minor or 
tactical actions can cause major disruptions at the strategic 
level…we must adapt our plans and strategies to the nature of the 
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culture and the people we encounter.  We cannot dictate that they 
see events, priorities, and our efforts through our own cultural 
prism. (pp.38-39) 
 
D. JOMINI’S PRINCIPLES VS. SUN TZU’S ART OF WAR 
Credited with having written the oldest-known treatise on the conduct of 
warfare, The Art of War (circa 500 B. C.), Sun Tzu takes a fundamental approach 
to the art of waging war by analyzing it in terms of a small group of key factors 
whose impacts on the attainment of victory in a given conflict are then estimated 
with regard to another set of significant elements or considerations.  Sun Tzu 
asserts that the factors of Moral Law, Heaven, Earth, The Commander, and 
Method and Discipline, when properly considered in terms of the advantages and 
disadvantages they provide to oneself and one’s adversaries, can be used to 
effectively determine the potential for both victory and defeat in battle.  These 
factors, when thought of in terms of our own, Western, way of thinking, can be 
viewed as Moral Influence, Weather, Terrain, Command, and Doctrine (Alger, 
1982, p.5).  Sun Tzu explains each of these factors in greater detail and 
emphasizes the significance of properly considering (and failing to consider) 
them as follows: 
The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with 
their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, 
undismayed by any danger.  Heaven signifies night and day, cold 
and heat, times and seasons.  Earth comprises distances, great 
and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; 
the chances of life and death.  The Commander stands for the 
virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.  
By Method and Discipline are to be understood the marshaling of 
the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among 
the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach 
the army, and the control of military expenditure.  These five heads 
should be familiar to every general; he who knows them will be 
victorious; he who knows them not will fail.  Therefore, in your 
deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let 
them be made the basis of a comparison…The general that 
harkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer—let such a 
one be retained in command!  The general that harkens not my 
counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat—let such a one be 
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dismissed!  While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself 
also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary 
rules.  According as circumstances are favorable, one should 
modify one’s plans. (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C. in Phillips, 1985, pp.21-23) 
 
While so vehemently emphasizing the necessity to consider and properly 
address these factors, Sun Tzu also maintained a firm belief in the notion that 
every conflict would be unique, in and of itself, and as such, that the conduct of 
one’s forces therein could not be governed by fixed rules or principles.  “In the art 
of war, there are no fixed rules.  These can only be worked out according to 
circumstances” (Alger, 1982, p.5).  Perhaps it is for this very reason that the 
armed forces of the Western world, with their affinity for rules-based methods 
and procedures, have never been significantly influenced by Sun Tzu’s 
teachings, despite the value of their understanding.  Instead, our forces, along 
with many of our allies, have long-embraced Jominian concepts of certain, 
fundamental principles, such as Mass, to govern the conduct of operations 
throughout numerous different conflicts without regard for their varied nature.   As 
discussed earlier, rigid adherence to these principles has not always resulted in 
victory for our military.  Continued reliance on this “cookie cutter-like” approach to 
waging war may be of even greater detriment in the years to come.   
 I submit that, in light of the growing complexity of the 21st century 
battlefield and the trend towards war being waged through predominantly 
unconventional means, Sun Tzu’s variety of military thinking may be more 
suitable than Jomini’s when preparing our forces to combat and effectively defeat 
both current and future enemies.  Consider the following areas of emphasis 
covered in SunTzu’s Art of War: 
 Energy—Concerned mainly with the effective use of both direct and 
indirect methods of attack and maneuver, Sun Tzu also points out the significant 
advantages to be gained by maximizing the flexibility of one’s forces.  This 
flexibility, stemming more from the indirect than the direct and shown to be a vital 
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aspect of our forces if they are to be successful in future endeavors, is beautifully 
described by Sun Tzu in terms of nature, colors, and music.  He writes, 
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but 
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.  Indirect 
tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, 
unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, 
they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass but to 
return once more.  There are not more than five musical notes, yet 
the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can 
ever be heard.  There are not more than five primary colors, yet in 
combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen…In 
battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct 
and indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless 
series of maneuvers.  The direct and indirect lead on to each other 
in turn.  It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end.  
Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combinations? (Sun Tzu, 
500 B.C. in Phillips, 1985, p.31) 
Maneuver and Offensive, principles which I have said will continue to be 
applicable to future wars, as well as Flexibility, which I offered for consideration 
as a “new” principle of war, appear to be inexorably intertwined in the teachings 
of Sun Tzu—much as they are likely to be on the 21st century battlefield.  
Additionally, Sun Tzu uses the subject of Energy to address the chaos inherent 
to warfare and how to use it to one’s advantage.  In this respect, he continues 
Clausewitz’s worries about “friction” and the “fog of war.”  His emphasis on this 
element of combat coincides nicely with my assertion that Complexity will be vital 
with regard to the manner in which we structure and disperse our forces against 
future adversaries. 
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming 
disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, 
your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against 
defeat.  Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated 
fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.  
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of 
subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity 
presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with 
weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.  Thus one who 
is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful 
appearances, according to which the enemy will act. (Sun Tzu, 500 
B.C. in Phillips, 1985, p.32) 
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Weak points and strong—Sun Tzu addresses this subject in terms of 
imparting one’s will on the enemy.  As it pertains to our own forces in future wars, 
Sun Tzu’s emphasis on secrecy and the ability to simultaneously attack the 
enemy at multiple points blends nicely with the aforementioned concept of 
Networking as a potential principle of war.  Complex in nature, difficult to discern, 
and providing our forces and their allies with the ability to maintain global 
coverage, our intricately-networked, but unified effort could strike the enemy at 
the point or points where he is least prepared. 
By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible 
ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated while the enemy 
must be divided.  We can form a single united body, while the 
enemy must split up into fractions.  Hence there will be a whole 
pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall 
be many to the enemy’s few…The spot where we intend to fight 
must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare 
against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces 
being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall 
have to face at any given point will be proportionately few. (Sun 
Tzu, 500 B.C. in Phillips, 1985, pp.34-35) 
Maneuvering—Sun Tzu regards tactical maneuver as the most difficult 
aspect of warfare because it involves, “…turning the devious into the direct, and 
misfortune into gain” (Phillips, 1985, p.37).  His concerns with regard to this 
subject are many, but well-founded.  With the continued applicability of Maneuver 
to our own forces, combined with innovative concepts such as “swarming” and 
my own assertion that Cultural Understanding is of growing importance, I submit 
that Sun Tzu’s teachings in this area are a good fit for our future military. 
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the 
designs of our neighbors.  We are not fit to lead an army on the 
march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its 
mountains and forests, its pitfalls.  We shall be unable to turn 
natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.  
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.  Move only if 
there is a real advantage to be gained.  Whether to concentrate or 
to divide your troops must be decided by circumstances.  Let your 
rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the 
forest…Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night and when 
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you move, fall like a thunderbolt. (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C. in Phillips, 
1985, pp.38-39) 
The use of spies—The vital nature of intelligence with regard to future 
warfare makes Sun Tzu’s emphasis on this subject particularly important.  Of 
course, when writing The Art of War, his teachings focused mainly on the 
traditional notion of human spies because HUMINT was the only available mode 
of intelligence gathering at the time.  At present, the concept of spying is multi-
faceted and the methods available for gathering intelligence are numerous.  In 
the future, capabilities will likely prove to be greater still.  Nevertheless, if our 
forces are to pursue advanced concepts, such as network-centric warfare, and 
make the sweeping doctrinal changes required to implement them effectively, 
Sun Tzu may be a truly worthy guide. 
…what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike 
and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, 
is foreknowledge.  Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from 
spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by 
any deductive calculation.  Knowledge of the enemy’s dispositions 
can only be obtained from other men…it is only the enlightened 
ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of 
the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great 
results.  Spies are a most important element in war, because on 
them depends an army’s ability to move. (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C. in 
Phillips, 1985, pp.60-63) 
 Though these are just a few of the teachings contained in Sun Tzu’s The 
Art of War, further scrutiny of this particular school of military thought will likely 
result in the discovery of additional information in support of applying this 
paradigm to our own military thinking in the future.  The overarching concept that 
war is unique in its every occurrence is what appears to differentiate it most 
distinctly from traditionally accepted Jominian concepts.   
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can 
see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.  Do not repeat 
the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods 
be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances…Water shapes 
its course according to the ground over which it flows; the soldier 
works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.  
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare 
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there are no constant conditions.  He who can modify his tactics in 
relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be 
called a heaven-born captain. (Sun Tzu, 500 B.C. in Phillips, 1985, 
pp.36-37) 
Our ability to contend with the emerging threats of the 21st century will depend on 
the willingness of our armed forces to become extremely adaptive and more agile 
than ever before.  Accordingly, it may be time to expand the horizons of our 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Yes, we have slain the dragon.  But now we live in a jungle filled 
with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes.  And in many ways, 
the dragon was easier to keep track of. 




The modern principles of war, integral to U.S. military thinking for nearly 
two centuries, have to some degree grown less applicable to the emerging 
threats and increasing complexity of the 21st century battlefield.  Low intensity 
conflict and the pursuit of warfare via unconventional means, though persistent 
elements in the conduct of war since the very beginnings of human conflict, have 
seemingly moved to the forefront of the long list of considerations and concerns 
faced by military leaders and planners in both current and future wars.  
Unconventional warfare (UW) has expanded significantly in its scope such that 
the complexities of war that must be overcome by our forces in both conventional 
and unconventional conflicts are daunting.  I submit that the distinction between 
these types of war has, at best, become extremely blurred.   
As a result of what appears to be a growing necessity for both 
conventional and unconventional forces to consider UW, its ramifications, and 
the overall role it plays in the complex nature of future warfare, I have examined 
the modern principles of war through what I have termed the UW “Lens.”  The 
results of my analysis may be depicted as shown in Figure 5-1.  Based on my 
analysis, I have determined that the majority of the modern principles of war are 
still applicable to the 21st century battlefield.  However, I found the principles of 
Mass, Surprise, and Simplicity to be significantly diminished with regard to their 
continued application to the complex circumstances and conditions likely to be 
encountered during the conduct of future wars. 
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It is important to keep in mind that the above figure is designed merely to assist 
in summarizing my conclusions about the decreased applicability of some 
principles of war for the U.S. military.  As a simple visual aid, it does not take into 
account the myriad circumstances and/or conditions that make each conflict and 
adversary situationally-unique. By no means should it be viewed as a 
straightforward assessment of the modern principles that assumes away the 
numerous complexities of warfare.  For example, one might look at Offense and 
ask whether it still maintains its applicability if both sides are equally well-armed 
and well-informed.  Given such circumstances, might not defense be more 
advantageous than attack?  Deriving the answer would be a thesis in and of 
itself. 
Following my determination that these three principles have questionable 
utility for our future armed forces, I thought it prudent to explore the possibility 
that several “new” principles may be considered as a means by which to amend 
or supplement the existing modern principles of war.  Networking, Flexibility, 
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Complexity, and Cultural Understanding are concepts that, if taken seriously and 
properly implemented, could revolutionize our armed forces and greatly enhance 
their capabilities with regard to waging war and achieving victory against the 
numerous and varied adversaries likely to be encountered in future conflicts.   
Finally, Jominian military thought and the concepts therein, which have 
essentially been the foundation for U.S. military doctrine and strategy for nearly 
two centuries, may need to be combined with other paradigms as we seek to 
embrace and implement major innovations designed to enhance our warfighting 
capabilities.  Although there may be others, Sun Tzu in particular appears to 
provide teachings that could serve us well as we look to concepts such as 
“swarming” and “network-centric warfare” to provide our forces with the agile, 
flexible, and increasingly capable postures that will be vital to their success. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Changing even just a few of the modern principles of war will not be an 
easy task that can be accomplished in short-order.  Even the simple notion of 
calling these often- termed “immutable” principles into question has stirred 
considerable concern among many.  Change is invariably difficult, but likely to be 
inevitable lest we choose instead to ignore the need for it and develop a keen 
fondness for the agony of defeat.  Many of the innovations currently being 
explored will require sweeping changes to our force doctrines to accompany their 
realization if they are to be successful.  Accordingly, changes to the very 
principles that have long served as a guide to our armed forces should, by my 
estimate, be carefully scrutinized and adjusted as necessary.  I fear that the 
contrary will occur and we will limit ourselves by falling into the trap of trying to 
make the “new” adapt to and fit into the “old.”    
I recommend that new and innovative concepts be studied and analyzed 
to determine the principles and tenets that best define and govern each of them 
in their individual applications.  Then, such study and analysis must continue to 
remain outside the harness of traditional thinking to effectively capture and 
embrace the school (or schools) of military thought that are most suitable for use.  
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Jomini, Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and others have all made considerable 
contributions to the study of warfare.  Wouldn’t we be best served by broadening 
our horizons and utilizing the sum total of their wisdom?  My own analysis, 
recommendations for “new” principles, and examination of an alternative school 
of thought, although limited in scope, will hopefully serve as a stepping stone for 
others whose efforts in a similar direction may effectively redefine the principles 
of war for the 21st century and beyond. 
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APPENDIX – CHRONOLOGY OF U.S. PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
(From:  The Essence of Victory: A Chronological Compendium, an  
appendix contained in The Quest for Victory by John I. Alger (1982)) 
 
Dennis Hart Mahan, “Principles Regulating the Plan and Profile of 
Intrenchments,” 1836 
 
 I.  A flanked position should be the basis of the plan of all intrenchments. 
 
          II.  Every angle of defence should be 900. 
 
         III.  A line of defence should not exceed 160 yards. 
 
        IV.  A salient angle should not be less than 600. 
 
         V.  A strong profile is essential to a vigorous defence. 
 
        VI.  The bayonet should be chiefly relied on to repel the enemy. 
 
       VII.  Intrenchments should be arranged to facilitate sorties. 
 
      VIII.  Intrenchments should contain a reserve proportioned to their 
importance. 
 
        IX.  Intrenchments should be defended to the last extremity. 
 
 
Matthew F. Steele, “A Few of Jackson’s Maxims,” 1909 
 
 1.  Always mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy if possible. 
 
 2.  When you strike him and overcome him never give up the pursuit as long as 
your men have strength to follow; for an enemy routed, if hotly pursued, becomes 
panic-stricken, and can be destroyed by half their number. 
 
 3.  Never fight against heavy odds if by any possible maneuvering you can hurl 
your whole force on only a part, and that the weakest part, of your enemy, and 
crush it. 
 
 4.  To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory is the 
secret of successful war. 
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 5.  A defensive campaign can only be made successful by taking the offensive at 
the proper time.  Napoleon never waited for his adversary to become fully 
prepared, but struck him the first blow. 
 
 6.  I had rather lose one man in marching than five in battle. 
 
 
United States Army, “Summary of Combat Imperatives,” 1911 
 
 1.  Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results. 
 
 2.  Make every effort for the success of the general plan an avoid spectacular 
plays that have no bearing on the general results. 
 
 3.  Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously.  Do not vacillate. 
 
 4.  Do not attempt complicated maneuvers. 
 
 5.  Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion. 
 
 6.  Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage 
of all available cover and thereby diminish losses. 
 
 7.  Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known. 
 
 8.  Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and 
avoid undue haste in committing them to action. 
 
 9.  Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain. 
 
10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority. 
 
11. Keep up reconnaissance. 
 
12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its 
use presents itself.  Keep some reserve as long as practicable. 
 
13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost. 
 








United States Army, “Combat Principles,” 1914 
 
The following principles apply to both offensive and defensive combat: 
Fire superiority insures success. 
Unity of command is essential to success.  The regiment united in combat 
has greater force and fighting power than have its three separate battalions.  A 
battalion acting as a unit is stronger than are four companies acting 
independently.  All the troops assigned to the execution of a distinct tactical task 
must be placed under one command. 
The task assigned any unit must not involve a complicated maneuver.  
Simple and direct plans and methods are productive of the best results in 
warfare. 
All the troops that are necessary to execute a definite task must be 
assigned to it from the beginning.  Avoid putting troops into action in driblets. 
Detachments during combat are justifiable only when the execution of the 
tasks assigned them contributes directly to the success in the main battle or 
when they keep a force of the enemy larger than themselves out of the main 
battle.  When combat is imminent all troops must be called to the probable field 
of battle.  A force is never so strong that it can needlessly dispense with the 
support of any of its parts during combat. 
Too many troops must not, however, be committed to the action in the 
early stages, no matter what be the nature of the deployment or the extent of line 
held.  Some reserves must be kept in hand. 
Use the reserve only when needed or when a favorable opportunity for its 
use presents itself.  Keep some reserve as long as practicable, but every man 
that can be used to advantage must participate in the decisive stage of combat. 
Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain. 
Flank protection is the duty of the commanders of all flank units down to 
the lowest, whether specifically enjoined in orders or not.  This applies to units on 
both sides of gaps that may exist in the combat lines. 
Reconnaissance continues throughout the action. 
 
 
United States Army, “Employment of Cavalry, General Principles,” 1914 
 
 1.  Mounted action is the principal method of fighting of cavalry.  
Animated by an aggressive spirit, it will seize every opportunity to attack with the 
horse and saber.  Success is achieved by simplicity in conception and vigor in 
the execution of plans. 
 2.  The rifle enables Cavalry on foot to engage in effective combat, 
offensive or defensive, against forces of all arms. 
 3.  In combining shock with fire action, the latter may be provided by the 
Horse Artillery, machine guns, or rifles, or by any combination of these arms. 
 4.  On account of the variety of its weapons and methods of action, 
Cavalry is capable of independent operations under practically all the conditions 
of war. 
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 5.  The large size of modern armies and the great extension of their fronts 
have rendered it more difficult than ever to change disposition once made and 
have augmented the importance of celerity and endurance in marching. 
 6.  Cavalry reconnoiters the theater of operations and the enemy’s 
dispositions; it protects the army against surprise and screens its movements. 
 7.  Habitual reliance on dismounted action will weaken and eventually 
destroy initiative; difficulties of terrain are likely to be overestimated.  Cavalry 
imbued with the true spirit of the arm does not remain inactive, waiting for a more 
favorable opportunity for a mounted charge. 
 8.  When small bodies of Cavalry unaccompanied by horse artillery or 
machine guns meet similar bodies of the enemy’s Cavalry, their best course of 
action will usually be to make and energetic mounted attack at once, should the 
ground be in any way suitable, without delaying or weakening the mounted attack 
by dismounting a part of the command. 
 9.  When opposing forces of Cavalry find themselves in contact, a 
decision as to the action to be adopted must be made and acted upon at once or 
disaster will result. 
10. During the operations preceding a general engagement, the first and 
most important antagonist is the enemy’s Cavalry. 
11. In a battle of all arms even relatively small forces of Cavalry may 
achieve important results by seizing an  opportune moment. 
12. The character of the enemy and the nature of the terrain exercise a 
controlling influence on the operations of Cavalry. 
13. Cavalry should be bold and enterprising. 
14. Cavalry must not only be strongly impressed with the power of its 
rifles, but must be ready to assault on foot and to capture positions held by the 
enemy with the same determination and resolution of Infantry. 
15. The most effective directions of attack are against the enemy’s flank 
and rear.  Enterprises against his communications may secure valuable results, 
but they should be so timed that the Cavalry will not be beyond reach for the use 
in a general engagement.  On the battlefield all bodies of troops must seek to 
contribute to the achievement of victory. 
16. The mobility of Cavalry comes into full play in the pursuit, to reap the 
fruits of victory; and in a retreat, in the quick utilization of successive defensive 
positions, and in the rapid withdrawal therefrom after breaking off the 
engagement at the last moment. 
 
 
United States Army, “The Fundamentals of Offensive Combat for Small 
Units,” 1918 
 
 Formation in depth of all offensive means. 
 The closest possible contact of assaulting units with the creeping barrage; 
this principle also applies to the contact with tanks. 
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 Concentration of individual effort within the group; mutual co-operation of 
neighboring units, aided by supports properly disposed, which make it possible to 
break local resistance and to repel counterattacks. 
 The combination of fire and movement; that is advance by rushes of a 
fraction covered by the fire of the remainder; engaging the enemy by fire in front 
while groups work around his flanks; direct advance by a portion under cover of 
artillery, machine guns or other troops. 
 Continued maintenance of liaison in every form, and especially with 
artillery. 
 Rapidity, order and continuity in infantry action. 
 Careful organization and accurate execution of the “cleaning up.” 
 The fearful effect of artillery, the action of tanks, and the German methods 
of combat restore to the infantry, once within the hostile positions, the necessary 
conditions for open warfare. 




United States Army, “Offensive Combat; General Principles,” 1919 
 
1.  The infantry must take the offensive to gain decisive results.  Both sides are 
therefore likely to attempt it, though not necessarily at the same time or in the 
same part of a long battle line. 
2.  An infantry that knows how to attack will know how to defend, because it is 
easier to defend than to attack.  The basis of training will be the attack. 
3.  The infantry attack has as its basis the fighting spirit and aggressiveness of 
officers and noncommissioned officers with fearless, intelligent leading on their 
part, and the individual initiative of the private soldier himself. 
4.  the primary duties of infantry commanders in combat are to maintain direction 
on their objectives, establish and maintain contact with the units on their flanks, 
and keep the higher command informed as to the situation. 
5.  There is no situation which can justify a commander for remaining in 
ignorance of the situation on his front. 
6.  Infantry has two general methods of action: fire and movement. 
7.  The movement of units in the advance to the attack should be made by 
bounds, i.e., successive positions along the axis of movement are selected as 
intermediate objectives and reconnoitered prior to occupation. 
8.  Surprise is an essential element of a successful attack. 
9.  The effect of surprise must be reinforced and exploited by fire superiority. 
10. The success of any operation undertaken by a unit depends in a large 
measure of the degree to which subordinate units lend each other mutual 
support.  The principle of mutual support is of especial application to units in 
support and reserve which have not been committed to action. 
11. The critical points of a hostile defensive system are in general those points 
which afford extensive observation, either over the defensive zone and its rear or 
the ground over which the attack must advance; and those points which control 
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the communications of the defensive zone (road centers, villages).  Such points 
are the especially important objectives of the attack. 
12. When officers and men belonging to fighting troops leave their proper places 
to carry back, or care for, wounded during the progress of the action, they are 
guilty of skulking.  This offense must be repressed with the utmost vigor. 
 
 
United States Army, “The Principles of War,” 1921 
 
The following are fundamental principles of war: 
 
a. The Principle of the Objective. 
b. The Principle of the Offensive. 
c. The Principle of Mass. 
d. The Principle of Economy of Force. 
e. The Principle of Movement. 
f. The Principle of Surprise. 
g. The Principle of Security. 
h. The Principle of Simplicity. 
i. The Principle of Cooperation. 
 
 
United States Army, “Combat, General Principles,” 1923 
 
378.  The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the 
enemy’s armed forces by battle.  Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy’s will 
to war and forces him to sue for peace. 
 
379.  Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the 
decisive place and time, creates the conditions most essential to decisive victory 
and constitutes the best evidence of superior leadership. 
 
380.  Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive.  Only through offensive 
action can a commander exercise his initiative and impose his will on the enemy. 
     A defensive attitude is never deliberately adopted except as a temporary 
expedient or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is 
not sought in order to concentrate superior forces at the point of decisive action. 
 
381.  Numerical inferiority does not necessarily commit a command to a 
defensive attitude.  Superior hostile strength may be overcome through greater 
mobility, higher morale, and better leadership.  Superior leadership often enables 
a numerically inferior force to be stronger at the point of decisive action. 
     A strategically defensive mission is frequently most effectively executed 
through offensive action.  It is often necessary for an inferior force to strike at an 
early moment in order to secure initial advantages or to prevent itself from being 
overwhelmed by a growing superiority in the hostile forces. 
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382.  All combat action must be based upon the effect of surprise.  Surprise 
takes the enemy in a state of moral and material unpreparedness, prevents him 
from taking effective countermeasures, and often compensates for numerical 
inferiority of force.  Surprise is sought not only in the initial stage of action and by 
larger units but also throughout the action and by units of every echelon of 
command.  The principle of surprise applies to fire as well as to movement. 
     The effect of surprise is dependent upon rapidity of maneuver, the efficiency 
of counterinformation measures, and the effectiveness of the means employed to 
deceive the enemy as to our own dispositions and intentions. 
      By feint and demonstration, the attacker attempts to mislead the enemy as to 
the time and place at which the principal effort is to be made.  Attacks designed 
merely to hold the enemy along a certain portion of the front are so made that 
they can not be distinguished from the principal effort and that the enemy is 
compelled to commit the largest possible proportion of his forces to meet them.  
Provision is made for exploiting success wherever attained. 
      The defense seeks to attain the effect of surprise through concealment of the 
location of its principal defensive works and its reserves so that the enemy will 
encounter resistance where he does not expect it, fall under the surprise fire of 
unlocated defensive elements, and expose himself to the action of the 
counterattack.  Provision for counteroffensive action is the most effective 
defensive measure against surprise. 
      The effect of surprise is furthered by variation in the means and methods 
employed in attack and defense.  Fixed methods of procedure enable the enemy 
to estimate the character and object of an operation. 
 
383.  The necessity for guarding against surprise requires adequate provision for 
the security and readiness for action of all units. 
      Each unit takes the necessary measures for its own local security as soon as 
the next higher unit has developed for action. 
      Provision for the security of flanks is of especial importance in combat. 
 
384.  The effect of surprise must be reinforced and exploited by fire superiority. 
      The attack can dispense with fire protection only when covered by darkness, 
fog, or smoke. 
      The defense can not ordinarily gain fire superiority through superiority in the 
means which it puts into action.  It must rely for fire superiority on better 
observation for the conduct of fire, on the more methodical organization of its fire, 
especially its flankings, more accurate knowledge of ranges and the terrain, the 
concealment of its dispositions, and the disorganization, which movement and 
accessory defenses produce in the attacker’s dispositions. 
 
385.  The necessity for concentrating the greatest possible force at the point of 
decisive action requires strict economy in the strength of forces assigned to 
secondary missions.  Detachments during combat are justifiable only when the 
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execution of tasks assigned them contributes directly to success in the main 
battle. 
 
386.  The task assigned to any unit must not involve a complicated maneuver.  
Simple and direct plans and methods are alone practicable in war. 
 
 
United States Army, “The Principles of War,” 1927 
 
1. The Principle of the Objective. 
2. The Principle of the Offensive. 
3. The Principle of Mass. 
4. The Principle of Economy of Force. 
5. The Principle of Fire and Movement. 
6. The Principle of Surprise. 
7. The Principle of Simplicity. 
8. The Principle of Security. 
9. The Principle of Cooperation 
 
 
United States Army, “Principles of Offensive Combat,” 1931 
 
1. Reconnaissance.—Reconnaissance, by means of which a commander 
gains information of the terrain and of the enemy confronting his command, will 
begin prior to, and continue throughout, an attack.  Every commander, no matter 
what his unit, makes personal reconnaissances.  Reconnaissance patrols are 
employed in almost all situations, and each is given a mission. 
 
2. Security.—Security is closely related to reconnaissance, since measures 
adopted to obtain information afford considerable protections.  However, each 
commander is directly responsible, regardless of provisions made by higher 
commanders, that his own unit is made secure. 
 
3. The Offensive.—Infantry troops must be aggressive, and must usually 
take the offensive in order to obtain decisive results. 
 
4. Surprise.—The principle of surprise requires that every effort be made to 
catch the enemy unaware, both in launching an attack and in carrying it through 
to a successful completion. 
 
5. Fire and Movement.—In offensive combat, to reach the enemy and 
overcome him in close combat is the object of infantry.  To reach him, it uses a 
combination of fire and movement. 
 
6. Mutual Support.—Mutual support, like other forms of cooperation between 
units, increases the chances of success.  The application of this principle 
77 
requires that an infantry unit, regardless of its size, assist others adjacent to it in 
getting forward. 
 
7. Holding Advantages Gained.—If an attack is a success, commanders of 
all infantry units must clinch the advantages gained by the enemy’s discomfiture.  
One of the most important and valuable means to accomplish this is the reserve. 
 
8. Simplicity.—Simple plans are likely to succeed; and, conversely, 
complicated schemes are liable to fail. 
 
9. Units of Command.—It is a well-established principle that there shall be 
only one commander for each unit, and one commander in each zone of action, 
who shall be responsible for everything within his unit or within his zone of action. 
 
10. Reserves.—That adequate reserves should be withheld during the initial 
stage of the attack, in order to provide a means of influencing the latter course of 
the action, is an important doctrine. 
 
 
United States Army Command and General Staff School, “The Principles of 
Strategy,” 1936 
 
1. The importance of offensive action. 
2. The importance of concentration of combat power. 
3. The importance of economy of force. 
4. The importance of mobility. 
5. The importance of surprise. 
6. The importance of security. 
7. The importance of cooperation. 
 
 
United States Army Command and General Staff School, “Principles of 
War,” 1939 
 
1. Principle of Security.—We must assure national security or we shall cease 
to exist as a nation.  National security is obtained through the avoidance of war 
and preparedness to meet war.  The security of a military force in the field lies in 
a correct estimate of all enemy capabilities with the provisions made to meet 
them; in maintaining freedom of movement, as well as in guarding against 
surprise. 
 
2. Principle of the Offensive.—Decisive results are obtained only by the 
offensive… 
 
3. Principle of Superiority.—This principle is applicable to both offensive and 
defensive warfare.  Superiority is vitally necessary to success when the national 
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attitude is offensive.  This statement applies both to the nation and to the armies 
in the field… 
 
4. Principle of the Unity of Effort.—Unity of effort is necessary to apply 
effectively the full power of the available forces.  Complete unity of the nation in 
war implies a single control for each effort and a uniting of all efforts under one 
head.  In the armed forces it is attained through unity of command.  Where this is 
impracticable, dependence must be placed on co-operation. 
 
5. Principle of the Common Objective.—There must be a common objective 
for all efforts.  This objective is defined by the political objective of the war which 
must be clearly understood.  For the nation, the common objective is usually 
secured through destroying the enemy’s will to continue the war.  For an armed 
force the military objective is the destruction of the hostile armed force.  This may 
be secured either by direct action or an indirect approach, such as the 
occupation of an area vital to the continued existence of the hostile armed force.  
In conducting military operations, definite points, lines, or areas must be 
designated to the coordination of effort. 
 
6. Principle of Simplicity.—There must be simple conceptions and the use of 
simple methods in war.  In the excitement and confusion of war, complicated 
actions greatly increase the chance of error.  The strength of a plan of operations 
is no greater than that of one of its subordinate parts, and if any part gives way 
because of an error or misunderstanding the whole plan may fall. 
 
 
United States Army, “Principles of War,” 1949 
 
97. The Objective 
98. Simplicity 
99. Unity of Command 
100. The Offensive 
101. Maneuver 
102. Mass 





United States Air Force, “Basic Principles of War,” 1949 
 
1. The will to win (rapidly).  (Applicable only to the offensive side.) 
2. Singleness of purpose. 
3. Coordination of ends and means. 
4. The principle of indirect approach. 
5. Surprise—Alternate objectives. 
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6. Intelligence. 





Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, “The Principles of War,” 1953 
 










Mobility (in place of Maneuver or Movement) 
 
Concentration (in place of Mass or Superiority) 
 






Readiness (to include both readiness of personnel and readiness of materiel) 
 
 
United States Army, “Principles of War,” 1954 
 
69. General 
     The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war.  
Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to 
successful conduct of military operations.  The degree of application of any 
specific principle will vary with the situation and the application thereto of sound 
judgment and tactical sense. 
 
70. Objective 








     Simplicity must be the keynote of military operations.  Simplicity must be 
applied to organization, methods, and means in order to produce orderliness on 
the battlefield. 
 
73. Unity of Command 
     The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command. 
 
74. Mass 
     Maximum available combat power must be applied at the point of decision. 
 
75. Economy of Force 




     Maneuver must be used to alter the relative combat power of military forces. 
 
77. Surprise 
     Surprise may decisively shift the balance of combat power in favor of the 
commander who achieves it. 
 
78. Security 
     Security is essential to the application of the other principles of war. 
 
 
United States Army, “Principles of War,” 1962 
 
110. General 
     The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war.  
Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to 
successful conduct of military operations.  These principles are interrelated and, 
dependent on the circumstances, may tend to reinforce one another or to be in 
conflict.  Consequently, the degree of application of any specific principle will 
vary with the situation. 
 
111. Principle of the Objective 
112.  Principle of the Offensive 
113. Principle of Mass 
114. Principle of Economy of Force 
115. Principle of Maneuver 
116. Principle of Unity of Command 
117. Principle of Security 
118. Principle of Surprise 
119. Principle of Simplicity 
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United States Army, “Principles of War,” 1968 
 
5-2. General 
     The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war.  
Their proper application is essential to the exercise of command and to the 
successful conduct of military operations.  These principles are interrelated and, 
depending on the circumstances, may tend to reinforce one another, or to be in 
conflict.  Consequently, the degree of application of any specific principle will 
vary with the situation. 
 
5-3. Principle of the Objective 
5-4. Principle of the Offensive 
5-5. Principle of Mass 
5-6. Principle of Economy of Force 
5-7. Principle of Maneuver 
5-8. Principle of Unity of Command 
5-9. Principle of Security 
5-10. Principle of Surprise 
5-11. Principle of Simplicity 
 
 





Economy of Force 
Maneuver 
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